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I. INTRODUCTION
A plaintiff from Maine sues an insurance company, incorporated in Maine and having its principal place of business in Maine, on
a loss incurred in Maine under a contract negotiated, written, and
executed in Maine. The plaintiff files the suit in Alabama to take
advantage of its liability law, its statute of limitations, its juries, its
rules of evidence, and its posture toward plaintiffs. The plaintiff
serves a representative of the insurance company traveling in
Alabama en route to an industry convention. For all the reasons the
plaintiff seeks a forum in Alabama, the defendant wishes to avoid that
forum. The importance of forum and the judicial tools available to
ensure that the most appropriate forum adjudicates disputes are the
subjects of this Note.
Prior to Burnham v. Superior Court of California,' a defendant
could successfully claim that Alabama's assertion of general jurisdiction should be determined under the constitutional fundamental fairness doctrine developed in the InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington2
and Rush v. Savchuk' line of cases. The defendant would explain the
regulatory nature of jurisdiction. The defendant would ask the trial
court to hold that Alabama's assertion of jurisdiction violates the
defendant's due process rights because Alabama lacks a regulatory
interest in adjudicating the dispute. The defendant would illustrate
Maine's regulatory interests in adjudicating the meaning of contracts,
setting policies, and protecting parties whose conduct occurred within
its borders.

1.
2.
3.

Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See infra Part III.A.
Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). See infra Part Ill.A.
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Burnham, with its appeal to tradition and black letter Aristotelian principles, closed this avenue of protection.! It held that a
forum's assertion of general jurisdiction based on physical presence
unrelated to the cause of action was per se constitutional. Defendants
must now seek alternative routes to ensure that the most appropriate
forum imposes its regulatory regime on the underlying dispute. In the
wake of Burnham, a small handful of scholars predicted that forum
non conveniens doctrine and the Federal Transfer Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), might become that avenue by allowing trial courts to reinsert fundamental fairness into jurisdiction determinations. This
Note illustrates that § 1404(a) accomplishes this task, although judges
and the legal community may not always realize that this is occurring.
Part II explains why forum matters. It examines the phenomenon of forum-shopping and the underlying reasons why plaintiffs
(and defendants) favor some fora over others. The Part argues that
the selection of a forum embodies more than simply choosing a physical location. The selection signifies the imposition of an entire regulatory regime. This Part illustrates how forum, more than anything
else, affects the distribution and adjudication of justice in this country.
Part I explores the evolution of constitutional jurisdictional
principles that came to recognize the importance of forum. By focusing on InternationalShoe and its progeny, the section traces the development of constitutional fundamental fairness safeguards against a
forum's assertion of general jurisdiction. It explains that when the
Supreme Court applied the fundamental fairness doctrine, it was
really concerned with the imposition of a regulatory regime. The
Court made ad hoc value judgments concerning the appropriateness of
a forum's regulatory regime. Subsequent developments in jurisdictional jurisprudence appeared to incorporate fundamental fairness
into general jurisdiction,5 thereby ensuring that only those forums
with regulatory interests will adjudicate particular disputes.
Part IV shows how Burnham v. Superior Court closed this avenue of constitutional protection. It examines how the Supreme Court's

4.
See, e.g., Stanley E. Cox, Would that Burnham Had Not Come to Be Done Insane! A
Critique of Recent Supreme Court Personal Jurisdiction Reasoning, An Explanation of Why
Transient Presence Jurisdiction is Unconstitutional, and Some Thoughts about Divorce
Jurisdictionin a Minimum Contacts World, 58 TENN. L. REV. 497, 499 (1991); Harold G. Maier
& Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdictionand Choice of Law, 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 249, 273-76 (1991); Bruce Posnak, The Court Doesn't Know its Asahi from its Wortman"
A Critical View of the ConstitutionalConstraintsof Jurisdictionand Choice of Law, 41 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 875, 877 (1990); Scott D. Irwin, Note, Burnham v. Superior Court of California: The
Final Word On Transient PersonalJurisdiction?,53 OHIO ST. L.J. 613, 628 (1992).
5.
General jurisdiction includes "generally present" and "transient" jurisdiction. See infra
note 47.
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decision in Burnham foreclosed further application of the fundamental
fairness doctrine developed in the InternationalShoe line of cases to
determinations of the constitutionality of general jurisdiction. This
Part addresses the criticism and the black letter basis of the decision.
Part V proposes an alternative to Burnham. It traces the development, purpose, and application of the common law doctrine of
forum non conveniens. The Part explores the Supreme Court's decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,6 in which the Court borrowed heavily
from the fundamental fairness standard of International Shoe. Gulf
Oil incorporated the notion of forum as regulatory regime into forum
non conveniens determinations.
Part VI begins the discussion of the Federal Transfer Statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1404. It explains the statute's purpose, legislative history,
use, and application in the federal judiciary. The Part illustrates how
district courts, in their application of § 1404, have developed numerous "factors" that go beyond mere "convenience" to ascertain the appropriateness of transfer.
Part VII looks beyond the rhetoric of convenience and concentrates on the many factors that district courts use in deciding
§ 1404(a) motions. The Part reveals that some trial judges actually
conduct a fundamental fairness analysis to impose the proper regulatory regime. It notes that most scholars have expressed disdain at
the plethora of factors and have described the entire § 1404(a) jurisprudence as one marked by chaos and inconsistency. These scholars
fail to realize that § 1404(a) is accomplishing what the Supreme Court
attempted to frustrate in Burnham: the use of ad hoc value judgments
under the auspices of fundamental fairness to select the proper forum
for a cause of action.
Finally, Part VIII examines the obstacles that may prevent
§ 1404(a) from actually carrying out the goals of fundamental fairness.
It questions the Supreme Court's decisions in Van Dusen v. Barrack'
and Ferens v. John Deere Co.8 The Part provides alternatives and
exceptions to the rules developed by those cases. It also answers those
who argue that the lack of appellate review of § 1404(a) motions presents a major problem. This Part explains that while these concerns
are understandable, they are rooted in appeals to black letter rules
and undervalue the need for trial judge discretion to make determinations on a case-by-case basis. Finally, it will advise against seduction

6.
7.
8.

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
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by black letter rhetoric and support the ad hoc, case-by-case approach
used presently, though surreptitiously, by trial judges.
H. THE IMPORTANCE OF FORUM

The judicial branch is designed to adjudicate disputes between
parties, to provide remedies for violations of rights, and to clarify and
announce the laws of the sovereign.9 Sovereigns' ° vest power in their
judicial branch as part of their overall regulatory regime." As a part
of this regime, it makes intuitive sense that the courts' function is to
apply only the laws of its sovereign.' For when a forum "purports to
do otherwise, it is not enforcing foreign rights but choosing a foreign
rule of decision as the appropriate one to apply to the case before it.""
Yet courts do not merely apply law, they create it.' Just as it makes
sense that a forum should only apply its own laws, it should only
create laws on behalf of its sovereign; for it contravenes the American
federal system of governance for courts of one sovereign to make laws
for another."6
Before a plaintiff brings a suit, his or her attorney will often research the optimal venue in which to file. This process of selecting the

9.

See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (1994) (discussing the role

of the federal judiciary); RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (4th ed. 1996) (same); Barry Friedman, Legal Theory: A
Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction,85 Nw. U.L. REV. 1
(1990) (same).
10. The use of the term "sovereign" includes any governmental power, but in the context of
this Note it refers primarily to states.
11. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art III. See also CHEMERINSKY, supranote 9, at 2 (explaining that
federal courts were designed "to effectively implement the powers of the natural government").
Black's Law Dictionary provides the following definition of the judicial branch: "An agency of the
sovereign created by it directly or indirectly under its authority... established and maintained
for the purpose of hearing and determining issues of law and fact regarding legal rights and
alleged violations thereof. . . ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 425 (4th ed. 1968) (citing Isbill v.
Stovall, 92 S.W.2d 1067, 1070 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936)).
12. See MYERS MCDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY 5 (1981) ('Rules
are not self-applying but are wielded by people acting as decision makers.").
13. Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 729 (Cal. 1967) (en banc); see Stanley E. Cox, Razing
Conflicts Facades to Build Better JurisdictionTheory: The Foundation-Thereis No Law But
Forum Law, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1993) ("[Clourts exist only to interpret, create and apply
their own government's laws.").
14. See generally Steven D. Smith, Courts, Creativity, and the Duty to Decide a Case, 1985
U. ILL. L. REV. 573 (discussing role of the courts and concluding courts possess law-making
power as long as deciding cases remains the essential function of the courts).
15. One need look no further than the definition of sovereign, which is "[A] person, body, or
state in which independent and supreme authority is vested...." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1395 (6th ed. 1990).
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most favorable forum has evolved into today's practice of forum shopping.16 Plaintiffs' lawyers realize that when they select a forum they
are choosing an entire decision-making regime, complete with its own
"substantive" law, "procedural" law, disposition towards plaintiffs,
In his dissent in Stewart
jury pool, and judicial idiosyncrasies."
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., Justice Scalia explained that
"[v]enue is often a vitally important matter, as is shown by the frequency with which parties contractually provide for and litigate the
issue. Suit might well not be pursued, or might not be as successful,
in a significantly less convenient forum." 8 This observation only
makes sense if the use of the word "convenient" assumes a meaning
not limited to physical convenience. It is doubtful that physical inconvenience would play an outcome determinant role in a case. With
advances in modern transportation and telecommunications, much of
the physical inconvenience of a far off location is illusory. Thus
Scalia's statement, as well as the prevalence of forum shopping engaged in by both plaintiffs' and defense attorneys, makes sense only if
venue includes certain regulatory functions and legal consequences
quite apart from the importance of physical location. 9

16. See J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13
WAYNE L. REV. 317, 333 (1967) ("Forum-shopping, among both federal and state courts, is a
national legal pastime."). See generally Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need
for More Limits on Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 267 (1996).
17. See Maier & McCoy, supranote 4, at 255 (explaining that "selection of the forum selects
an entire decision making regime"). But see Posnak, supra note 4, at 899 & n.130 (explaining
somewhat naively that jurisdiction never "necessarily and directly" affects a case's outcome).
18. Stewart Org., v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 39-40 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Ironically, Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604
(1990).
19. Some authors, however, do not acknowledge these factors associated with a forum apart
from the forum's substantive law. See, e.g., Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A
Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1283 (1986) ("As a tactical matter, it is
difficult to see why a plaintiff would continue to prefer a forum far removed from the situs of the
dispute once the court has rejected the argument that the forum's substantive law should
govern."). This may be explained by the fact that venue is seldom treated at any considerable
length in many introductory civil procedure classes. See Stowell R. R. Kelner, Note, "Adrift on
an UncharteredSea"' A Survey of Section 1404(a) Transfer in the Federal System, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 612, 613 n.8 (1992) (illustrating the scant attention paid to venue in civil procedure
casebooks); see also JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS, 326-57,
245-325, 62-244 (7th ed. 1997) (dedicating half as many pages to venue and forum non
conveniens as subject matter jurisdiction and one-fifth of the pages dedicated to personal
jurisdiction); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND
PROCEDURE (7th ed. 1994) (devoting 34 pages to venue and forum non conveniens in its 300 page
chapter on "Choosing the Proper Court"); MAURICE ROSENBERG ET AL., ELEMENTS OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 335-50 (5th ed. 1990) (dedicating 15 pages to venue, transfer of venue, and forum
non conveniens of the 172 pages discussing the courts' adjudicatory authority). Such scant
treatment may be explained by commentators seeing questions of jurisdiction and choice of law
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Plaintiffs' lawyers often go to great lengths in evaluating prospective forums because the selection has an inescapable, if not
determinative, influence on the result-a result that cannot be nullified by the forum's decision to apply the rules of some other
sovereign.' A party may prefer a forum or venue for a number of
reasons beyond the desire to take advantage of more favorable substantive law. Such reasons include: the party's convenience; preference for judges in the chosen forum; preference for the substantive
and/or procedural laws in a given forum; jury biases and propensities,
including disposition toward plaintiffs and defendants as well as size
of awards; the belief that potential jurors in a particular forum are
more receptive to the filing party's position; regional biases; local
public policy preferences; and docket congestion.'
Empirical examples of how these factors influence the choice of
forum are readily apparent. Texas has become a very favorable place
for a plaintiff to file a suit. During the 1980s, Texas's substantive and
procedural laws became considerably more pro-plaintiff, while Texas
juries became famous (or infamous) for large awards.' Texas courts
provide a forum for almost any personal injury or wrongful death
action over which they can constitutionally obtain jurisdiction.' Not
to be outdone, Madison and St. Clair counties in Illinois have worked
hard to become "nationally known for pro-plaintiff verdicts and very
large damage awards."' Alabama has likewise tweaked its laws and
policies to attract prospective plaintiffs. One small county in the
state, Barbour County, became "nationally recognized [by defendants]
as tort hell." ' Courts in each of these fora represent their respective
sovereign's policies and values. In other words, they are a functional
part of their sovereign's regulatory regime. Given the propensity for

as one in the same, and interrelating forum with venue and transfer issues. Unfortunately, this
Note illustrates that this is not often the explanation. See infra Part VII.C.
20. See Maier & McCoy, supra note 4, at 255. The authors explain that plaintiffs go to
"great lengths to obtain a forum likely to select policies that will produce results more favorable
than those likely to obtain in other available fora, and defendants regularly resist such a forum
for precisely the same reasons that led the plaintiff to seek it." Id. at 266-67 (footnote omitted).
21. See id. at 283 (collecting various factors); Norwood, supranote 16, at 272 (same).
22. See Alex Wilson Albright, In Personam Jurisdiction:A Confused and Inappropriate
Substitute for Forum Non Conveniens, 71 TEX. L. REV.. 351, 354 & n.15 (1992) (citing empirical
and anecdotal evidence of Texas's claim to fame as a plaintiffs mecca); see also Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
1507, 1508 n.1 (1995) (providing illustrations of the lengths plaintiffs will go to in order to forum-

shop).
23. See Albright, supranote 22, at 354-55.
24. Norwood, supranote 16, at 278.
25. Gregory James, Where the Torts Blossom, TIME, Mar. 20, 1995, at 38.
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abuse and injustice, forum shopping has drawn the ire of judges and
commentators who condemn the practice.'
Anecdotal evidence of plaintiff forum shopping, however, does
not prove that forum shopping results in the imposition of an improper regulatory regime. A recent study by Professors Clermont and
Eisenberg illustrates the importance of forum shopping and its real
effects on individual justice."7 The study collected vast amounts of
data to show how the choice of a forum affects a plaintiffs chance of
The research found that the plaintiffs rate of winning
winning.'
dropped from 58% in cases in which a transfer was not granted to 29%
in transferred cases.2 9 The findings and statistical analysis demonstrate that forum does affect outcome.' This conclusion held true even
after controlling for the merits of the case, procedural progress at
termination, method of disposition, jurisdictional basis of cases, and
additional variables."
Professors Clermont and Eisenberg observed that even though
plaintiffs selected a favorable forum and the applicable rule of decision
did not change after transfer to a more appropriate forum, the plaintiffs "win rate markedly drops.., thus, the supposedly procedural
device of transfer appears to have a remarkably substantive effect." '
Another study of more limited data examined the final outcomes in
nineteen Supreme Court cases on judicial jurisdiction. It found that
the plaintiffs' success rate dropped from 83% in cases in which jurisdiction was upheld to 0% in cases in which it was not.33

26. See, e.g., Norwood, supra note 16, at 301 ("While thousands of cases contain general
unsupported dicta criticizing forum-shopping as wrong, our judicial system, in practice, supports
shopping for juries and laws.') (footnotes omitted). But see Kelner, supra note 19, at 638
("laintiff forum shopping is not an evil to be avoided, but rather is an inherent part of our
federal court network.').
27. See generally Clermont & Eisenberg, supranote 22.
28. See id. at 1507.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 1518-25. But see David E. Steinberg, Simplifying the Choice of Forum: A
Response to Professor Clermont and Professor Eisenberg, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1479, 1482 (1997)
(outlining flaws in Clermont and Eisenberg's methodology).
32. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 1514. The authors noted that this illustrates

the effects of the transferee court's own procedural law, the local variations of which could affect
outcome. In support of this observation they cite Professors Maier and McCoy's thesis of a unified
theory for judicial jurisdiction and choice of law. See supranote 4.
33. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 514 n.18 (citing Christopher D. Cameron &
Keven R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shopping and Outcome Determination Under
International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 776-78, 817-32 (1995)). But see Erwin
Chemerinsky, Assessing Minimum Contacts: A Reply to Professors Cameron and Johnson, 28
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 863, 864-65 (1995) (questioning the study).
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Professors Clermont and Eisenberg submit that the most powerful explanation of the disparity in success rates involves forumshopping, insofar as the plaintiffs success rate declines because the
plaintiff lost an unfair forum advantage. ' Courts have long sensed
what Professor Clermont and Eisenberg empirically demonstrated.
Sensitivity to the importance of forum led to the development of judicial protection for defendants. Courts' first recognition of the importance of forum choice came in the field of jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court subsequently created constitutional protection under the Due
Process Clause to protect defendants from the assertion of jurisdiction
by an inappropriate regulatory regime.'
Unfortunately, the Court
recently blocked this avenue of protection.'
III. DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION
JURISPRUDENCE TOWARD RECOGNITION OF WHY FORUM MATTERS
To understand the development of forum and the Supreme
Court's subsequent unwillingness to recognize its importance, it is
helpful to review the development of constitutional protection against
jurisdiction assertions by inappropriate fora. In the beginning there
was Pennoyer v. Neff. Decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1877, it
established two broad categories of jurisdiction, in personam and
attachment of property." The former comprises generally present,
temporarily present, and minimum contacts/long-arm jurisdiction, 8
while the latter covers in rem, quasi in rem, and Seider-style juris-

34. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supranote 22, at 1514. The authors continue:
Thus, the forum-shopping explanation of the transfer effect leads to a corollary: the effect
of transfer in changing outcome is good [because] [t]ransfer removes the plaintiffs forum
advantage when the interest of justice so counsels, and therefore removes the plaintiffs
opportunity to gain an unjust victory in litigation or to achieve an unjust settlement.
Id. at 1515. But see Steinberg, supra note 31, at 1481 n.6 ("Professor Clermont and Professor
Eisenberg do not discuss the radical implications of their suggestion that transfers lead to more
accurate outcomes. Accurate substantive results should be the preeminent goal of litigation.").
35. See infra Part I.
36. See infra Part IV.
37. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724 (1877). See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the
Constitutional Law of PersonalJurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 35 (1990) (describing the difference between in rem and in personam
jurisdiction as well as their historical and logical roots). See generally Daniel 0. Bernstine,
Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In Personam Jurisdiction?,25
VILL. L. REV. 38 (1979) (discussing various types of personal jurisdiction); Irwin, supra note 4, at
617 n.22.
38. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977) ("[U]nder Pennoyer state authority to
adjudicate was based on the jurisdiction's power over either persons or property. This
fundamental concept is embodied in the very vocabulary which we used to describe judgments.").
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diction. Pennoyer v. Neff held that a forum may constitutionally assert jurisdiction over a defendant who was "generally" or temporarily
present. 9 It also held that in rem jurisdiction did not violate a defendant's due process rights."' Later cases, Harrisv. Balk1 and Seider v.
Roth, 2 held that a forum may constitutionally assert quasi in rem
jurisdiction and gain jurisdiction over an insured defendant through
the attachment of his or her insurance contract. These three cases
create the basis of traditional black letter jurisdiction analysis.
A. International Shoe and its Progeny
In 1945, the Supreme Court started to provide constitutional
protection that deviated from traditional black letter jurisprudence.
When the Court decided International Shoe Co. v. Washington,3 it
took the first step toward a reconceptualization of jurisdiction." The
Court no longer split jurisdiction between jurisdiction over the person
and jurisdiction over property.' All jurisdiction was over the person. 6
This concept embraced general jurisdiction, 7 which encompassed both

39. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732-33.
40. See id. at 733.
41. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 221-24 (1905).
42. Seider v. Roth, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315 (N.Y. 1966).
43. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
44. See Borchers, supranote 37, at 54 ("InternationalShoe has been widely heralded as the
great 'liberator' of personal jurisdiction from the formalisms of Pennoyer, and it is undoubtedly
true that InternationalShoe ushered in an era of expanded jurisdictional reach for state courts.'!)
(footnote omitted); Kevin M. Clermont, Restating TerritorialJurisdiction and Venue for State
and FederalCourts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 415-16 (1981) (describing InternationalShoe as a
conceptual break from Pennoyer); Harold K. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 772, 783-84 (1983) (same); Maier & McCoy, supra note 4, at 263 (discussing the
new, flexible approach InternationalShoe ushered in, representing a departure from Pennoyer);
Robert T. Mills, PersonalJurisdiction Over Border State Defendants: What Does Due Process
Require?, 13 S. ILL. U. L. REV. 919, 919 (1989) (explaining InternationalShoe's break from
Pennoyer). But see David Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of
Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 693 (1987) (stating that "InternationalShoe is
consistent with Pennoyer'sconceptual framework').
45. The Court in Shaffer v. Heitner,433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977), explained that
[i]f a court's jurisdiction is based on its authority over the defendant's person, the action
and judgment are denominated 'in personam' and can impose a personal obligation on the
defendant in favor of the plaintiff. If jurisdiction is based on the court's power over
property within its territory, the action is called 'in rei' or 'quasiin rem.'
46. See InternationalShoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 ('Historically the jurisdiction of courts to
render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person.
Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition
of a judgment personally binding him.'!) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877)).
47. General jurisdiction permits a forum to assert jurisdiction over a cause of action that did
not necessarily arise within that forum. It includes transient jurisdiction and generally present
jurisdiction. Transient jurisdiction allows a forum to assert jurisdiction over any defendant who
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generally present and temporarily present varieties, and special, or
specific, jurisdiction,4 8 which included for all intents and purposes in
rem, quasi in rem, Seider-style, and long arm jurisdiction.49 The Court
in International Shoe wanted to ensure that the proper regulatory
regime could constitutionally assert jurisdiction over the cause of
action. It chose not to apply the rules developed in Pennoyer v. Neff to
an out-of-state defendant. Rather, the Court considered the fundamental fairness of a court in the state of Washington asserting jurisdiction over the defendant under the particular facts of the case.'
The Court held that "due process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tradi-

is found within the state. Generally present jurisdiction permits a forum to assert jurisdiction
over any defendant who has continuous and systematic contact with the forum.
48. For a definition of special or specific jurisdiction, see Maier & McCoy, supra note 4, at
256 n.21.
49. See Cox, supra note 4, at 522 n.99 (citing those "[r]elatively few writers [who] have
explored in any detail the differences between specific vs. general jurisdiction); Arthur T. von
Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1121, 1136-37 (1966) (coining the terms nearly 20 years prior to the Supreme Court's use of
them). The Supreme Court adopted these terms in HelicopterosNacionales de Colom., S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). It explained them in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 473 n.15 (1985). See generally Albright, supra note 22, at 369 (explaining the distinction
between and the relative power provided to the courts by general and specific jurisdiction); Mary
Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1988); Maier & McCoy,
supranote 4, at 250 (The notion of general jurisdiction embodies the presumption that it is fair
to subject the defendant to the rigors of litigation in any place where the defendant is generally
present, either physically or through a regular course of business or other contacts, even if the
cause of action arose in another state and that other state alone possesses prescriptive
jurisdiction over the issues in the case.'); Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal
Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 537 n.47 (1995) (providing definitions);
Douglas A. Mays, Note, Burnham v. Superior Court. The Supreme Court Agrees on Transient
Jurisdictionin Practice, But Not in Theory, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1271, 1276 n.51 (1991) (" 'General
jurisdiction' is a court's ability to assert personal jurisdiction regardless of the relationship
between the cause of action and the defendant's activities in, or affecting, the forum state. In
contrast, 'specific jurisdiction' is the power to assert jurisdiction in claims arising out of activities
that occur in the forum state or that have a direct effect there.").
50. See InternationalShoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. In deciding the fairness of jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court looked to the defendant's activities in the state of Washington, which consisted of
contracting with between 11 and 13 sales persons under the direct control of sales managers
located in St. Louis between 1937 and 1940. See id. at 313-14. The sales representatives worked
primarily in Washington and International Shoe compensated them by commission. See id. The
sales agents could only exhibit products and solicit orders, although some set up showrooms and
performed other activities to secure orders for International Shoe. See id. All the merchandise
shipped into Washington was invoiced at the place of shipment, from where collections were also
made. See id. at 314. The cause of action arose when Washington sought to collect
unemployment taxes based on commissions paid by the firm to its Washington-based sales
persons. See id. at 311-12.
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tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ...The Court struggled to define both "minimum contacts" and "traditional notions of fair
'
play and substantial justice."52
It noted that a test of fair play might
include an estimate of the inconvenience that would result to the
defendant corporation from a trial away from its home or principal
place of business.' The decision had the effect of expanding state
jurisdiction through long-arm statutes but restricting state jurisdiction in areas that Pennoyer, Harris, and Sieder considered constitutional.' It also brought "a flood of commentary."' InternationalShoe
thus advanced the notion that a forum with substantial regulatory
interests in the underlying dispute should be constitutionally able to
assert jurisdiction over the cause of action. It signified the replacement of black letter rules with regulatory interest and appropriateness analysis.
The Supreme Court acknowledged this substitution in Shaffer
v. Heitner.' It held that International Shoe had supplanted traditional rules that had placed jurisdiction into two categories, presence
and attachment." The Court explicitly substituted the fundamental

51. See id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
52. See id. at 316-20. The Court explained that continuous and systematic presence
suffices, but casual contact does not. However, the Court stated that when the cause of action
arises from the corporation's activities within the forum, an assertion of jurisdiction does not
offend notions of fair play and substantial justice. See id. The Court concluded that "[w]hether
due process is satisfied must depend ... upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to
the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process
clause to insure." Id. at 319.
53. See id. at 317.
54. The Courtin Shaffer v. Heitner,433 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1977), explained that
Pennoyer sharply limited the availability of in personam jurisdiction over defendants not
resident in the forum State. If a nonresident defendant could not be found in a State, he
could not be sued there. On the other hand, since the State in which property was located
was considered to have exclusive sovereignty over that property, in rem actions could
proceed regardless of the owner's location.
See also Borchers, supra note 37, at 54 ("InternationalShoe has been widely heralded as the
great 'liberator' of personal jurisdiction from the formalisms of Pennoyer, and it is undoubtedly
true that InternationalShoe ushered in an era of expanded jurisdictional reach for state courts.")
(footnote omitted); Cox, supra note 4, at 509 ("Shaffer explicitly recognized that the
constitutional shift to minimum contacts meant both a weakening and strengthening of state
jurisdictional power.').
55. See Borchers, supranote 37, at 57 & n.227 (citing the "flood of commentary').
56. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
57. See id. at 212 ("We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must
be evaluated according to the standards set forth in InternationalShoe and its progeny.') In a
footnote, the Court explained that "[ilt would not be fruitful for us to re-examine the facts of
cases decided on the rationales of Pennoyer and Harristo determine whether jurisdiction might
have been sustained under the standard we adopt today. To the extent that prior decisions are
inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled." Id. at 212 n.39. See also Maier & McCoy,
supranote 4, at 264.
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fairness test of International Shoe for the black letter approach of
Pennoyer and Harris in quasi in rem cases.' In dicta, the Court also
introduced fundamental fairness considerations into in rem cases.'
The case also illustrates the regulatory nature of jurisdiction and
sheds light on the factors that make up "minimum contacts." The
Court did not consider the convenience of the parties as an overriding,
or even important, factor.' Rather, it found the place of the defendant's activities crucial to its determination of minimum contacts."'
Since the tort did not arise from the defendant's action within the
forum, the Court held the forum's exercise of jurisdiction fundamentally unfair, even though the Court found that the forum's substantive tort law should apply. 2 This distinction between choice of
jurisdiction and choice of law is one of the most pervasive dichotomies
in conflicts law.' This distinction has inevitably been at the core of
much conflicts law confusion.'
Concern over protecting defendants from assertions of jurisdiction by inappropriate fora led the Supreme Court, in Rush v.

58. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 209; see also Borchers, supranote 37, at 64 (noting that Shaffer
found 'quasi-in-rem holdup' an unconstitutional jurisdictional device). In his concurrence in
PacificMutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 36 (1991), Justice Scalia explained that
the Court in Shaffer
invalidated general quasi in rem jurisdiction, saying that 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice' can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms
that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are inconsistent
with the basic values of our constitutional heritage.
Scalia noted his view that such cases are wrongly decided. See id.The Court declined to extend
Shaffer in PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806 (1985), to jurisdiction over absent
class-action plaintiffs. The Court did, however, recognize the link between choice of jurisdiction
and choice of law. See id.at 823.
59. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204-06, 211; see also Stewart, shpra note 19, at 1274 ("Shaffer
has sounded the death knell of jurisdiction based upon seizure of property without an evaluation
of the contacts which the presence of such property represents between the defendant and the
forum. ). Due to the nature of the dispute, a purely in rem case will rarely be fundamentally
unfair to the defendant because the dispute relates to the defendant's property and presumably
the defendant's contacts with the state.
60. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 213-14 (discussing primarily state interest in regulating the
dispute).
61. See id. at 216.
62. See id.
63. This distinction, however, seems unwarranted given the Supreme Court's recognition of
the relationship between the minimum contacts analysis for personal jurisdiction and the nearly
identical significant relationship tests for the due process limitations on choice of law. See, e.g.,
PhillipsPetroleum Co., 472 U.S. 797; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Clay v. Sun
Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Watsons v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66
(1954); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
64. See Cox, supra note 13, at 5 n.7 ("The Court unfortunately and mistakenly has usually
dichotomized personal jurisdiction and choice of law theory.).
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Savchuk, to replace the traditional rule of Seider-style jurisdiction"
with an approach that incorporated fundamental fairness concerns.'
The Supreme Court held that International Shoe, and neither
Pennoyer v. Neff nor Seider, provided the appropriate test for jurisdiction over a defendant through attachment of his or her insurance
policy."' In Rush, two Indiana residents were involved in a car
accident in which a passenger suffered injuries.68 State Farm insured
the car, which the defendant owned, under a policy issued in Indiana.'
Indiana's guest statute' barred claims by passengers.7 A year after
the accident, the injured passenger moved to Minnesota and
commenced an action against State Farm and the defendant in
Minnesota. '2 The plaintiff sought jurisdiction over the defendant
through attachment of his insurance policy since State Farm was
"generally present" in Minnesota." In its opinion, the Court explained
that Minnesota unconstitutionally asserted jurisdiction because it was
not fundamentally fair to name the defendant-driver in a Minnesota
lawsuit against the insurer.'
In a footnote, the Court explained
numerous additional reasons why such an assertion would be
fundamentally unfair to the defendant-driver. 5 The Court noted that

65. This was the first time the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of Seider-style
jurisdiction. The Second Circuit had previously approved of the jurisdictional device whereby a
plaintiff attaches the defendant's insurance policy to gain jurisdiction over the defendant. See
Minishiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (1968), adhered to en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (1968). The
Supreme Court in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1980), noted that while New York,
New Hampshire, and Minnesota had adopted Seider-style jurisdiction, Maryland, California,
Louisiana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and other states had explicitly rejected the practice based on
state law or constitutional grounds. See id. at 327 n.13.
66. See Rush, 444 U.S. at 326-29; see also Borchers, supra note 37, at 68 (explaining Seiderstyle jurisdiction and noting that Rush found it unconstitutional).
67. See Rush, 444 U.S. at 327 (explaining that in Shaffer v. Heitnerthe Court held that "all
assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
InternationalShoe and its progeny') (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 322.
69. See id.
70. See IND. CODE § 9-3-3-1 (1976) (repealed 1991).
71. See Rush, 444 U.S. at 322.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 330-32.
75. See id. at 331 n.20:
A party does not extinguish his legal interest in a dispute by insuring himself against
having to pay an eventual judgment out of his own pocket. Moreover, the purpose of
insurance is simply to make the defendant whole for the economic costs of the lawsuit;
but noneconomic factors may also be important to the defendant.
Professional
malpractice actions, for example, question the defendant's integrity and competence and
may affect his professional standing. Further, one can easily conceive of cases in which
the defendant might have a substantial economic stake in Seider litigation-if, for
example, multiple plaintiffs sued in different States for an aggregate amount in excess of
the policy limits, or if a successful claim would affect the policyholder's insurability. For
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a judgment against the defendant-driver would affect his insurance
5 Additionally, it would allow plaintiffs to
rates and his insurability."
sue for damages in excess of the insurance policy limits by permitting
them to sue in a number of states.77 These reasons hold whether the
defendant-driver is named or not. ' Rush, and the cases on which it
builds, illustrate the Supreme Court's growing sensitivity to the
regulatory nature of a forum's assertion of jurisdiction.
B. Recognition of Jurisdictionas the Imposition
of a Regulatory Regime
In Shaffer v. Heitner, the Supreme Court declared that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the
standards set forth in InternationalShoe and its progeny."' Such a
declaration illustrates the movement towards a unified theory of
jurisdiction based on the idea of jurisdiction as not place but rather
the imposition of a regulatory regime.' It confirms why forum matters. A forum's assertion of jurisdiction imposes an entire body of local
influences8 1 that bear on the result even though they have no "functional relationship to the defendant's rights and duties to the plaintiff."2 Applying the substantive law of the proper regulatory regimen

these reasons, the defendant's interest in the adjudication of his liability cannot
reasonably be characterized as de minimis.").
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. Many have questioned the constitutionality of direct action statutes (when a plaintiff
sues the defendant's insurance company) for these very reasons. The Supreme Court in
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 417 (1954), declined to decide whether all
direct action statutes were unconstitutional, concentrating instead on the narrow issue before
the Court: whether federal law on marine vessel insurer liability preempted a Louisiana direct
action statute. The Court in Rush distinguished direct actions from Seider-style actions, leaving
doubt over the constitutionality of direct action statutes. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 330
(1980).
79. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
80. See Cox, supra note 4, at 511, 530 (explaining that the "justification for jurisdiction is
not the presence of property or a person within the state, but rather the need to regulate the
defendant conduct which led to the ligitation" and concluding that "[t]ransient presence
jurisdiction is unconstitutional because it attempts to allow a state to assert jurisdiction without
any underlying significant connection to the defendant or the litigation"); Maier & McCoy, supra
note 4, at 257 (arguing that "[a]ll cases should meet the test adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner").
81. See supra note 21? and accompanying text.
82. See Maier & McCoy, supranote 4, at 267.
83. See Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 729 (Cal. 1967) (en banc) ("IT]he forum can only
apply its own law.... When it purports to do otherwise, it is not enforcing foreign rights but
choosing a foreign rule of decision as the appropriate one to apply to the case before it."); Cox,
supra note 13, at 3 ("[C]ourts exist only to interpret, create and apply their own government's
laws.").
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cannot mitigate this unfairness to the defendant because "the interpretation, application and other incidents of that rule will be greatly
influenced, if not controlled, by the special local mores, attitudes and
practices of the forum's decision makers.""
Subsequent cases support this proposition.'
In Kulko v.
Superior Court, the Court held that California's jurisdictional laws
(which gave jurisdiction to a plaintiff in a child custody and support
cause of action against an out-of-state defendant who did not possess
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum) violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The Court appeared to recognize that jurisdiction was not just a place; rather, it was the imposition of a whole mass of regulatory authority that included California
juries, rules of evidence, and choice of law rules. In other words,
forum mattered. The Court did not find convenience an overriding
consideration even though the plaintiff and her children all lived in
California. Instead, the Court concentrated on the defendant's contacts with the forum that related to the specific cause of action. It
looked to these contacts in order to determine whether California
could appropriately impose its regulatory regime on the cause of
action." The Court, perhaps for the first time, explicitly stated that a
forum's assertion of jurisdiction constituted the imposition of its sovereign's regulatory machinery. It also recognized that the choice of a
state's regulatory regime may dramatically affect a case's outcome."
The Supreme Court's decision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson further illustrates this movement toward viewing jurisdiction not as a place but as the imposition of a regulatory regime.'
All the parties in World-Wide Volkswagen understood the importance
of forum. The plaintiffs sued in an Oklahoma county notorious for its
favorable jury awards to recover for injuries suffered there in an
accident involving the allegedly defective placement of the rear gas

84. Maier & McCoy, supra note 4, at 267; see MCDOUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 12, at 5
(' Rules are not self-applying but are wielded by people acting as decisionmakers."). The
tremendous amount of forum-shopping in our legal culture offers the best support for this thesis.
See supra note 16, and accompanying text. But see Borchers, supranote 37, at 92 (arguing that
jurisdiction should not invoke any due process/minimum contacts limitations). However, some
explain that Burnham is dicta because jurisdiction was possible on specific jurisdiction grounds.
See Maier & McCoy, supranote 4, at 257 n.29.
85. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Clay v. Sun Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Watsons v. Employers
Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
86. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91-94 (1978).
87. See id. at 100.
88. See supranotes 16-21 and accompanying text.
89. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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tank.' The defendants were the distributor of the car, World-Wide
Volkswagen (which distributed in New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut), and the dealer, Seaway, a retail dealer in New York.
The other two defendants, Audi, which manufactured the vehicle, and
Volkswagen of America, which imported the vehicle from Germany,
did not appeal jurisdiction to the Supreme Court."1
The Supreme Court declared that it was fundamentally unfair
for Oklahoma to assert jurisdiction over World-Wide and Seaway
because the defendants' conduct and connection with the state were
such that they could not reasonably anticipate being haled into an
Oklahoma court."2 The Court employed rhetoric such as "the burden
on the defendants," "the forum state's interest," "the plaintiffs interest
in obtaining convenient and effective relief," the "interstate judicial
system's interest," and "substantial social policies" in support of its
determination that the forum unconstitutionally asserted jurisdiction." The Court noted, however, that even if the plaintiff had satisfied all these concerns, a forum's assertion of jurisdiction may still
violate due process if fundamentally unfair." In effect, the Court was
explaining the inherent unfairness of an Oklahoma forum regulating
an activity entirely conducted in New York and New Jersey. The
decision cemented the notion that jurisdiction consists of much more
than just a brick and mortar courthouse.
World-Wide Volkswagen may be understood as the creation of
constitutional jurisdictional protection to ensure the imposition of the
proper regulatory regime. The test thus seems to become whether

90. See id. at 288. The plaintiffs had purchased the car in New York while residing there.
The accident occurred en route to Arizona, where the family was relocating. See id.
91. See id. at 288 & n.3.
92. See id. at 297 ("lItis that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State
are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.).
93. Id. at 292.
94. Id. at 294 ("Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being
forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong
interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient
location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism,
may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.') (emphasis
added). Professors Maier and McCoy note that "[t]his quotation recognizes a direct relationship
between individual liberty values and federalism concerns." Maier & McCoy, supra note 4, at
268.
95. Brainerd Currie developed the idea of governmental interest, under which the court
analyzes the state's relationship to the litigation to determine whether application of its
regulatory regime (law and its implications) can reasonably be expected to effectuate the state's
policies. See Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests
and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 9-10 (1958). See generally Robert A. Sedler,
Professor Juenger's Challenge to the Interest Analysis Approach to Choice-of-Law: An
Appreciation and a Response, 23 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 865 (1990) (responding to criticism of
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the defendant's activities within the state gave rise to the cause of
action before the forum. This test, however, is inadequate, for it
would force the plaintiff in World-Wide Volkswagen to go to Germany
to bring suit against the German manufacturer of the allegedly defective product. Thus jurisdiction must include those actions with reasonably foreseeable consequences that might cause harm within the
forum. This is the stream of commerce rationale,' which still views
jurisdiction as the imposition of a regulatory regime but inserts foreseeability into the test.97

interest analysis); Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of
Laws: A Response to the 'New Critics,"34MERCER L. REV. 593 (1983) (responding to more recent
critics of Currie and arguing that the interest analysis remains the preferred approach to the
resolution of choice of law problems); Russell J. Weintraub, A Defense of Interest Analysis in the
Conflict of Laws and the Use of that Analysis in Products Liability Cases, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 493
(1985) (defending Currie's interest analysis).
96. The stream of commerce theory originated as a basis for jurisdiction in products liability
cases. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (Ill.
1961). Citing Gray, the Court, in dicta, in World-Wide Volkswagen affirmed the application of
the stream of commerce theory to manufacturers and distributors. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 297-98. Courts find jurisdiction based on stream of commerce consistent with due
process fundamental fairness because the forum state has an interest in regulating the
manufacturing process of those products that are released into the stream of commerce and bear
a reasonably foreseeable chance of causing harm within the forum. See, e.g., Bean Dredging
Corp. v. Dredge Tech. Corp., 744 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th Cir. 1984) (emphasizing the state's
interest in regulating the economic injury suffered by state resident); Poyner v. Erma Werke
Gmbh, 618 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir. 1980) (explaining that "[i]njuries caused by inherently
dangerous articles imported through independent distributors certainly fall within that class of
litigation with which the forum state has a deep interest in adjudicating'), cert denied, 449 U.S.
841 (1980). For analysis of stream of commerce, see, for example, CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1069 at 348-55 (2d ed. 1987); David P. Currie,
The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdictionin Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F.
533; Monroe Leigh, "Streamof Commerce" Theory as Basis for Assertion of PersonalJurisdiction
over Foreign Manufacturer, 81 A.J.I.L. 654, 656-58 (1987); Martin B. Louis, The Grasp of Long
Arm JurisdictionFinally Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C. L. REV. 407 (1980); Mollie A. Murphy, Personal
Jurisdictionand the Stream of Commerce Theory: A Reappraisaland a Revised Approach, 77 KY.
L.J. 243 (1989); Pamela J. Stephens, Sovereignty and Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine: Up the
Stream of Commerce Without a Paddle, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 105 (1991); Harry B. Cummins,
Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in Product Liability
Actions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1028 (1963); Erik T. Moe, Comment, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court.: The Stream of Commerce Doctrine, Barely Alive But Still Kicking, 76 GEO. L.J.
203 (1987).
97. An example illustrates the stream of commerce rationale. If a Texan shoots a gun
across the Oklahoma line and kills someone in Oklahoma, then a forum in Oklahoma may
constitutionally assert jurisdiction over the Texan defendant because the gunman could
reasonably foresee such a consequence. Cox, supra note 4, at 558 n.304, contains a similar
example.
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C. Determiningthe ProperRegulatory Regime
Through constitutional jurisdictional principles, the Supreme
Court made ad hoc value judgments concerning the appropriateness of
imposing a forum's regulatory regime.9 8 Unfortunately, the Court
frequently cloaked this ad hoc value judgment in black letter rhetoric.
Despite the Court's appeal to certain black letter constructs, the results in Kulko and World-Wide Volkswagen support the proposition
that jurisdiction equals the imposition of a regulatory regime.' The
majority opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen explained that a forum's
assertion of jurisdiction still must reflect fundamental fairness regardless of convenience to the parties.'" The majority expressly
rejected Justice Brennan's dissent, which couched its discussion in
convenience and jurisdiction-as-place terms. '
The Court's ad hoc judgments of fairness, however, present
three problems. First, Western culture lives in a black letter system
in which courts reach back to previous cases and grab terms without
necessarily associating them with the underlying concepts. ' Second,
courts can use this rhetoric to justify a forum's assertion of juris-

98. See Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1515 (11th Cir. 1990) (explaining that due process
inquiry requires more than mere satisfaction of a long-arm statute "because each case will
depend upon the facts') (quoting Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenias, 554 So.2d 499, 500 (Fla.
1989)); Stewart, supra note 19, at 1265 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted):
According to the Supreme Court, if there are minimum contacts between a defendant and
the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice, jurisdiction may properly be asserted. The court must
evaluate the contacts in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws, and
there must be evidence of some intent on the part of the defendant to avail himself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thus invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws. In other words, the propriety of personaljurisdictiondepends upon the facts of
the case.
Some commentators have expressed dismay at this case-by-case balancing. "[M]inor changes in
circumstances can change the result. That alone would make prediction in a particular case
difficult, but the task is even more formidable because courts cannot agree on which facts
matter." Weintraub, supra note 49, at 540 (footnote omitted). Some courts have echoed these
concerns:
Now, one would think that in a rational system... experienced lawyers could simply and
with conviction unanimously answer [the merchant buyer's question whether it can get
jurisdiction over its merchant seller.] But alas we know, to our embarrassment, that the
only honest answer the lawyer can probably give is a 'Gee, I can't say for sure.'
Hall's Specialties, Inc. v. Schupbach, 758 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1985).
99. See Maier & McCoy, supranote 4, at 270 (noting that the comparative inconvenience to
the defendant discussed in InternationalShoe received no serious attention from the Court in
Kulko and World-Wide Volkswagen).
100. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 294.
101. See id. at 300-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. See generally Thomas R. McCoy, Logic v. Value Judgment in Legal and Ethical
Thought, 23 VAND. L. REV. 1277 (1970) (illustrating the pervasive problem of legal shorthand
created to identify the legal consequences that should attach to a set of identifiable facts).
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diction, not for regulatory reasons, but for convenience reasons.
Third, the rhetoric allows its invocation when a court implements a
bad objective, such as favoring the plaintiff or defendant.
These problems surfaced in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court.'3 The Supreme Court struggled to align its own feelings of fundamental fairness with the rhetoric found in previous cases.
The Court knew that in asserting jurisdiction over the indemnity
agreement between Asahi and Cheng Shin, California was not attempting to regulate a cause of action that arose within that forum.
Rather, California was attempting to regulate contract rights between
Asahi and Cheng Shin that did not arise out of conduct within or
affecting the forum.' The Supreme Court arrived at the correct decision from a regulatory regime point of view but did not articulate
regulatory reasoning. The Court's opinion did not distinguish the
cause of action that arose from the accident in California from the
pause of action that arose from a contract dispute completely outside
of the forum." 5 Thus the Court failed to articulate and understand
what it instinctively knew. It failed to articulate why constitutional
jurisdiction jurisprudence developed in the first place: to recognize
why forum matters. Cheng Shin argued that the action arose out of a
motorcycle accident and that Asahi had minimum contacts with the
forum because the cyclist's suit was foreseeable."
Cheng Shin

103. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). The original suit arose
from a California motorcyclist's allegation that his injuries and passenger's death were caused by
a sudden loss of air and an explosion in the rear tire of the motorcycle. The complaint cited
defects in the motorcycle tire, tube, and sealant. It named Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co.,
Ltd. ("Cheng Shin"), the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube. "Cheng Shin in turn filed a crosscomplaint against Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., the manufacturer of the tube's valve
assembly," seeking indemnification based on Cheng Shin's agreement with Asahi. The plaintiff
settled his claims with Cheng Shin and the other defendants, leaving only Cheng Shin's
indemnity action against Asahi. Asahi challenged California's jurisdiction to resolve the
indemnity action, and the Supreme Court ultimately agreed with Asahi that California's
jurisdiction exceeded constitutional protections. See id. at 105-106.
104. See Stanley E. Cox, The Interrelationshipof Personal Jurisdictionand Choice of Law:
ForgingNew Theory Through Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 189,
214-27 (1987) (arguing that the result in Asahi, while correct, should have been reached on the
basis of the particular indemnity claims pursued in the action rather than on the basis of stream
of commerce arguments not present before the Court). Others have commented that "[i]n light of
these facts, Asahis holding that jurisdiction would be unfair is essentially correct." Moe, supra
note 96, at 203 (arguing that Asahi should be distinguished from situations involving a resident
plaintiff when the state has an overriding interest in asserting jurisdiction over foreign
defendants).
105. See Asahi, 480 U.S. atpassim.
106. Cheng Shin provided the affidavit of a manager whose duties included the purchasing of
component parts. The manager stated:
[l~n discussions with Asahi regarding the purchase of valve stem assemblies the fact that
my Company sells tubes throughout the world and specifically the United States has
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attempted to sell the Court on the rhetorical formula "arising out of'
without looking to the underlying meaning." This argument caused
the Court much trouble and led at least four justices to reconsider the
entire stream of commerce rationale.' ° Had the Court looked to the
underlying concepts and separated the causes of action before it, it
could have articulated what the Court instinctively knew-that it was
fundamentally unfair to the defendant for California to impose its
regulatory regime on conduct (in this case a contract dispute) that
occurred entirely outside the forum and had no foreseeable consequences within the forum." The failure of the Court to distinguish
jurisdiction-as-a-regulatory-regime from jurisdiction-as-a-place fostered the confusion. On the surface, the Court validated the idea of
jurisdiction-as-place, but the Court's result makes sense only when
regarded as endorsing "jurisdiction as the imposition of a regulatory
regime."
D. Extending Protection to All Assertions of Jurisdiction
Subsequent developments in jurisdiction jurisprudence appeared to incorporate fundamental fairness into general jurisdiction."
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall provides evidence of this

been discussed. I am informed and believe that Asahi was fully aware that valve stem
assemblies sold to my Company and to others would end up throughout the United States
and in California.
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 702 P.2d 543, 549-50 n.4 (Cal. 1985). Cheng Shin's
lawyers clearly couched their argument in terms of a products liability case that arose out of a
motorcycle accident instead of a contract dispute. The record to the Supreme Court did not even
include the contract between Cheng Shin and Asahi. See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 24. The Supreme
Court of California agreed with Cheng Shin that its action "against Asahi arises from Asahi's
forum-related activity.... Asahi, 702 P.2d at 550 n.6. Asahi argued in vain to the California
Supreme Court that "California has no interest in exercising jurisdiction. .. ." Id. at 543.
107. The Court failed to understand that the indemnity suit did not arise out of the
motorcycle accident. Rather, it arose out of a contract between the two parties that had no affect
on the forum.
108. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 108-13 (1987).
Part U.A of Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Powell and Scalia.
109. Some commentators argue that this lack of realization justifies limiting Asahi to its
facts. See, e.g., Moe, supra note 96, at 203. Others note that "the parties and the courts
apparently lost sight of the forum non conveniens aspects. ... " Russell J. Weintraub, Asahi
Sends PersonalJurisdictionDown the Tubes, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 55, 62-63 (1988).
110. See, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The
"Power"Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 311-12 (1956) ("It may well be that in
the law of jurisdiction over individuals ... a substantial 'minimum contact' will ultimately be the
touchstone of permissible jurisdiction.'); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court
Jurisdiction,1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241, 281 ('Ever since InternationalShoe, Pennoyer v. Neff has
been eligible for oblivion.... [A]ll jurisdictional problems [should] be approached as ones of the
existence of minimum contacts between the forum and the transaction in litigation.).
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transition."' There, the Supreme Court held that Texas's assertion of
jurisdiction under its long-arm statute violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the defendant lacked
minimum contacts with the forum with respect to the plaintiffs cause
of action."
The Court found that the defendant was not generally
present because it did not have systematic and continuous contacts
with the forum."' The Court rejected the notion that mere presence
suffices. Instead, the Court incorporated InternationalShoe and the
fundamental fairness standard into general jurisdiction."" Such a
result can be explained only by recognizing the importance of forum
and the unfairness to a defendant created by an inappropriate sovereign's imposition of its regulatory regime.
The Court's apparent move toward a fundamental fairness
standard for both specific and general jurisdiction followed the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which stated that International Shoe and its progeny governed transient jurisdiction (and
perhaps generally present jurisdiction)."' Numerous lower courts also

111. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
112. See id. at 413-17 (1984).
113. See id. at 415-16 ("All parties to the present case concede that [Hall's] claims against
Helicol did not 'arise out of,' and are not related to, Helicol's activities within Texas. We thus
must explore the nature of Helicors contacts with the State of Texas to determine whether they
constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts the Court found to
exist in Perkins. We hold that they do not.). The Supreme Court, however, has provided little
guidance with respect to this basis for general jurisdiction, having addressed "the parameters of
continuous and systematic contacts only twice." Albright, supra note 22, at 375; see Linda J.
Silberman, "Two Cheers" for International Shoe (andNone for Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth
Anniversary of International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755, 765 (1995) (noting the little
guidance from the legislatures or the courts in defining general jurisdiction, which reaches both
transient and generally present parties).
114. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416. The Court thought that the plaintiffs conceded the
issue of specific jurisdiction and thus analyzed the case only in terms of general jurisdiction. See
id. at 415 & n.10; see also Weintraub, supra note 49, at 537 (noting the substantial limitations
Helicopterosplaced on the exercise of general jurisdiction).
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24, cmt. b, at 29 (Draft of Proposed
Revisions, Apr. 15, 1986) ("One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction. This principle
is that a state does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it.
With respect to judicial jurisdiction, this principle was laid down by the Supreme Court of the
United States in International Shoe... .'). The Comment continued: 'Three inconsistent factors
are primarily responsible for existing rules of judicial jurisdiction. Present-day notions of fair
play and substantial justice constitute the first factor." Id.; see also id. § 28, cmt. b, at 41 ("The
Supreme Court held in Shaffer v. Heitner that the presence of a thing in a state gives that state
jurisdiction to determine interests in the thing only in situations where the exercise of such
jurisdiction would be reasonable.... It must likewise follow that considerations of
reasonableness qualify the power of a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over an individual on
the basis of his physical presence within its territory."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 8 cmt. a, p. 64 (Tent. Draft No. 5, Mar. 10, 1978) (Shaffer establishes "'minimum contacts' in
place of presence as the principal basis for territorial jurisdiction.'). These proposed changes and
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concluded that transient jurisdiction did not survive International
Shoe and its progeny."' In fact, transient jurisdiction "ha[d] been
almost universally criticized by commentators....

.""'

This criticism

emerged from the idea that a forum asserting transient jurisdiction
likely has no interest in imposing its regulatory machinery."' Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, decided on forum non conveniens grounds,"9 appeared

tentative drafts signaled a departure from the previous text. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1971) ("A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an
individual who is present within its territory, whether permanently or temporarily.'); id. § 28,
cmt. a (A defendant's "presence in the state, even for an instant, gives the state judicial
jurisdiction over him.'); see also Maier & McCoy, supra note 4, at 273 (noting the doctrinal
development since InternationalShoe).
116. See, e.g., Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress, 765 F.2d 42, 46-47 (3d Cir. 1985); Harold M.
1986); Schreiber v.
Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305, 310-14 (N.D. Ill.
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079, 1088-91 (D. Kan. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 611
F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979); Bershaw v. Sarbacher, 700 P.2d 347, 349 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
117. Albright, supranote 22, at 382.
118. See generally, Robert H. Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal
Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 18 (1982) (noting that intra-territorial
assertions of personal jurisdiction are not necessarily subject to International Shoe's fairness
scrutiny); Bernstine, supra note 37, at 47-68; Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General
Jurisdiction,66 TEX. L. REV. 723, 752-53 (1988) (criticizing the current justification for transient
jurisdiction); Ehrenzweig, supra note 110, at 290 (providing examples of the shortcomings of the
transient rule); Donald W. Fyr, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme Court's Latest Last Words on
State Court Jurisdiction, 26 EMORY L.J. 739, 770-73 (1977) (discussing fairness problems
inherent in transient jurisdiction); Frank R. Lacy, PersonalJurisdictionand Service of Summons
After Shaffer v. Heitner, 57 ORE. L. REV. 505, 510 (1978) (examining the jurisdiction issue in the
context of service of summons); Maier & McCoy, supra note 4, at 272-73; Bruce Posnak, A
Uniform Approach to Judicial JurisdictionAfter World-Wide and the Abolition of the "Gotcha"
Theory, 30 EMORY L.J. 729, 735 n.30 (1981) (noting how the Court in InternationalShoe utilized
a functional approach in examining the appropriate principles underlying personal jurisdiction);
Martin H. Redish, Due Process,Federalism,and PersonalJurisdiction:A Theoretical Evaluation,
75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112, 1117 n.35 (1981) (citing Ehrenzweig, supra note 110, for the proposition
that the "first principle" of Pennoyer remains good law although the Shaffer Court disregarded
it); Robert A. Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer v.
Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1031, 1035 (1978) (discussing personal jurisdiction in the context of
guest-host immunity); Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 33, 75 (1978) (noting that, if the power theory is rejected as counter to due process, the
traditional notion of physical presence as a basis for jurisdiction based on territorial sovereignty
becomes "constitutionally suspect); David H. Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of In Personam
Jurisdiction-A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 273, 303
(noting that the presence of a defendant's property in a forum contributes little to the forum
interest in the outcome); Arthur T. von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories
Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. REV. 279, 300-07 (1983) (discussing the transition from a
power theory to a fairness theory beginning in the second decade of the twentieth century);
Donald J. Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of PresentOriented Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 565, 589 (1979) (noting that the proposition that
one is within the territorial limits of the states over which he flies on a commercial airline flight
can "find no support in the post-Shaffer world of jurisdiction"); Joseph P. Zammit, Reflections on
Shaffer v. Heitner, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 24 (1978) (noting that predicating jurisdiction on
the presence of the person or property is absurd).
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to recognize the importance of forum and provided a mandate for the
standard of fundamental fairness as the appropriate test for all types
of jurisdiction.'
A unified standard for both general and specific jurisdiction not
only recognizes that imposition of the appropriate regulatory regime
should be the real issue, but it also acknowledges the merging of
choice of jurisdiction with choice of law." By recognizing jurisdiction
as the imposition of a regulatory regime, mere presence unconnected
119. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509-12 (1947) (discussed infra Part IV).- Albert
Ehrenzweig noted in 1956 that forum non conveniens developed to balance the dogmatic rule of
personal service. See Ehrenzweig, supranote 110, at 292.
120. Consider the statement by one commentator before the Supreme Court decided
Burnham:
The facts of Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert are anything but unique and constitute perhaps the
easiest example of a case dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens that should
have been dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.... To consider the Gilbert factors
twice is absurd. To fail to consider them in a jurisdictional analysis is wrong... "
Stewart, supranote 19, at 1288, 1294 (footnote omitted). The author cites a number of cases that
illustrate situations in which courts should have dismissed on jurisdictional rather than forum
non conveniens grounds. See id. at 1289 n.108.
121. See Maier & McCoy, supra note 4, at 251 ("We argue for what may appear to be a
radical reconceptualization of the subjects of judicial jurisdiction and choice of law. In fact, we
urge merely an appreciation of the legal realists' understanding of the judicial-decision making
process and a recognition of the logic already implicit in modern decisions that articulate the law
of judicial jurisdiction in terms of minimum significant contacts.") (footnotes omitted). Prior to
Professors Maier and McCoy's observation, Professor Inglis wrote that "questions of jurisdiction
and choice of law [are not] always separate issues. Many so-called 'choice of law' rules can in fact
be regarded fundamentally as rules of jurisdiction." B. D. Inglis, Jurisdiction,The Doctrine of
Forum Conveniens, and Choice of Law in Conflict of Laws, 81 L. Q. REV. 380, 380 (1965). A year
later, Professors von Mehren and Trautman observed that modern courts were fostering the
evolution of jurisdictional theory beyond traditional conceptions. They illustrated that, in a
growing number of cases, courts used dispute-specific relationships between the defendant, the
forum state, and the cause of action to justify jurisdiction. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 49, at 1136; see also Twitchell, supra note 49, at 643-45; Stanley E. Cox, Choice of Law: How
it Ought to Be: Responses to Transcript: The InterestedForum, 48 MERCER L. REV. 727, 738 n.32,
755 (1997) (espousing a view that personal jurisdiction should be limited in a way that causes an
"interested forum, applying its own law," to be "the only forum that should ever adjudicate a
case"); Cox, supra note 13, at 8; Alfred Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 960, 961, 987-93 (1981) (discussing whether the Court's dicta in
InternationalShoe that sufficient choice of law contacts may not be sufficient to establish longarm jurisdiction obscures understanding of both choice of law and long-arm jurisdiction); Earl M.
Maltz, Visions of Fairness-TheRelationship Between Jurisdictionand Choice of Law, 30 ARIZ.
L. REV. 751 (1988) (arguing that the Court adequately protects fairness through its restrictions
on personal jurisdiction rather than on choice-of-law); James Martin, PersonalJurisdictionand
Choice-of-Law, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872 (1980) (suggesting that the Supreme Court should require a
minimum contacts test for choice of law in addition to jurisdiction); Wendy Collins Perdue,
Personal Jurisdictionand the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REV. 529 (1991) (discussing the
problem of an undeveloped doctrine of personal jurisdiction from a philosophical perspective);
Courtland H. Peterson, Jurisdictionand Choice of Law Revisited, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 37 (1988)
(discussing jurisdiction and choice of law generally); Posnak, supranote 4, at 884; Sedler, supra
note 118, at 1040 (concluding that "Shaffer may stimulate rethinking about the interrelationship
between judicial jurisdiction and choice of law").
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with a cause of action does not justify the imposition of the forum's
regulatory regime, nor does it permit that forum to apply its soverIn Burnham v. Superior Court, the
eign's laws to the conduct."i
of constitutional jurisdictional
creation
this
Supreme Court rejected
jurisprudence to ensure proper forum."'
IV. BURNHAMAND THE DEATH OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTIONAL
PROTECTION FROM A FORUM'S ASSERTION OF GENERAL JURISDICTION

In Burnham v. Superior Court of California," the debate over
whether fundamental fairness had become the operable constitutional
test for general jurisdiction came to a head.' The underlying cause of
action concerned a divorce and custody battle.' When the defendant
temporarily visited the forum, the plaintiff served the defendant with
process for divorce. 7 Both the plaintiff and the defendant realized the
importance of forum." The defendant sought constitutional protection
by arguing that the standard of fundamental fairness applies in cases
in which a forum asserts only general jurisdiction. Mere presence, the
defendant argued, does not warrant the imposition of a forum's regulatory regime." Such an understanding acknowledges the regulatory
nature of forum. The Supreme Court rejected this understanding.

122. Under a jurisdiction-as-place understanding, general jurisdiction appears constitutional
because jurisdiction is but a place to adjudicate disputes and separate from choice of law.
123. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 616-19 (1990). See Cox, supra note 13, at
12 n.21 ("Unfortunately, in Burnham v. Superior Court, the United States Supreme Court
refused to shut the door to just such unfairness, by approving transient jurisdiction, the
quintessential example of a forum taking jurisdiction of a case when it has no legitimate
regulatory interest in the underlying litigation.") (citation omitted). See generally George B.
Reese, Conflict of Laws, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 167 (1993) (surveying 1993 cases in New York
confronting conflict of law issues).
124. Burnham, 495 U.S. 604.
125. See Maier & McCoy, supra note 4, at 276-77 (criticizing Burnham for its failure to
decide this debate correctly but noting that "[t]he seeds of that decision were sown long ago by
the failure of courts and commentators to understand that the assertion of judicial jurisdiction is
the assertion of the authority to make law in the case before the court, not solely an assertion
that a case can be decided at a given geographical location").
126. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 607-08.
127. See id. at 608.
128. Forum in this case included California juries, policies, morals, jury awards,
presumptions, etc.
129. He cited Shaffer and Rush as well as the Restatements, Gulf Oil, and the regulatory
See Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially Over International
interests thesis.
Defendants: Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV.
593, 594 n.12 (The defendant "challenged the constitutionality of transient jurisdiction on the
basis that mere physical presence did not dispense with the requirement that he have 'minimum
contacts' with the forum state."). A few lower courts had held so. See supra note 116. The
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The Court announced that the fundamental fairness standard
developed by International Shoe and its progeny does not apply to
assertions of general jurisdiction." Rather, traditional rules that
allow a forum to assert jurisdiction over defendants with continuous
and systematic contacts (generally present) or those served while in
the forum (transient or "gotcha" jurisdiction) are per se constitutional.131 Under generally present jurisdiction, a defendant is subject to a forum's jurisdiction when the defendant has continuous and
systematic contacts with the forum state, regardless of where the
cause of action arose. 3 ' For example, if the defendant lives in Tennessee and is involved in a car accident in Los Angeles, a Tennessee
forum may assert jurisdiction over the defendant because he or she is
said to be "generally presene' in the state. Under transient jurisdiction, a forum may assert jurisdiction over defendants served with
process while (perhaps temporarily) in the state. Fora may thus gain
jurisdiction over a cause of action even if they have little or no contact
with the underlying facts or the defendant. 3' For example, a forum in
California may constitutionally assert jurisdiction over a defendant
served in the Los Angeles airport while on a layover, though the
defendant had no other contacts with or relations to the forum. Both
forms of jurisdiction fail to recognize why forum matters and instead
view it merely as a physical location with which the party has voluntarily acquainted itself.
The Burnham majority held constitutional a forum's assertion
of general jurisdiction because that notion has deep traditional roots.3 '

defendant thought that presence could not sustain general jurisdiction. See Hay, supra, at 594 n.
12.
130. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 621.
131. See id. at 612-19. Many, including Justice Brennan in his concurrence, dispute the
traditional notion of transient jurisdiction. See id. at 635-37 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment); Ehrenzweig, supra note 110, at 292, 294-95, 298, 300, 302-04, 308; Werner, supra
note 118, at 568-71; Irwin, supranote 4, at 629.
132. See supranote 110.
133. See Mays, supra note 49, at 1272 n.7 (defining transient jurisdiction); see also Burnham,
495 U.S. at -612 ("Decisions in the courts of many States in the 19th and early 20th centuries

held that personal service upon a physically present defendant sufficed to confer jurisdiction,
without regard to whether the defendant was only briefly in the State or whether the cause of
action was related to his activities there.'). The propensity for unfairness resulted in "virtual
unanimity among commentators that jurisdiction should not necessarily flow from service on the
defendant in the forum. These commentators reached this conclusion primarily because of the
unfairness to the defendant that such assertions of jurisdiction might entail." Posnak, supranote
118, at 744; see also Bernstine, supra note 37, at 62 ("[1]t is reasonable to argue that the
transient rule is unfair to defendants in light of the holdings of InternationalShoe and Shaffer.');
Vernon, supra note 118, at 303 ("Because it was unfair to assert jurisdiction in Shaffer, it is
unfair to assert jurisdiction in the transient defendant case.').
134. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 621.
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The opinion sparked a fury of criticism.'35 If the opinion turned on
tradition, one may ask why Burnham did not overrule Shaffer and
Rush, which provided constitutional protection from assertions of
special jurisdiction. Burnham did not, however, abolish constitutional
protection in cases where a forum asserts special jurisdiction." The
majority matter-of-factly distinguished these special jurisdiction cases
and saw no need to revert to traditional constitutional analysis in
them. 23

Tradition should not allow the improper imposition of a regulatory regime. In other contexts the Court does not pay such unbending
heed to tradition.'8 The Court would not uphold the admissibility of
coerced confessions based on their traditional constitutional validity in
the nineteenth century, just as it rejected the traditional separate but
equal understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3'9 It would be
problematic that tradition could override the fundamental fairness
standard of the Due Process Clause. This perhaps illustrates that the
Court was less concerned with history and more concerned with
creating black letter rules that it thought individuals could better
0
follow.""

135. See Hay, supra note 129, at 593; Majer & McCoy, supra note 4, at 273-77; Irwin, supra
note 4, at 628-30; Martin Redish, Tradition, Fairness,and Personal Jurisdiction:Due Process
and ConstitutionalTheory After Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 675 (1991); Allan
R. Stein, Burnham and the Death of Theory in Personal Jurisdiction,22 RUTGERS L.J. 597
(1991); Mary Twitchell, Burnham and ConstitutionallyPermissible Levels of Harm, 22 RUTGERS
L.J. 659 (1991); Armand Paliotta, Note, Jurisdiction: Burnham v. Superior Court: Adding
Confusion to Transient Jurisdiction,44 OKLA. L. REV. 551 (1991); Robert Taylor-Manning, Note,
An Easy Case Makes Bad Law--Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 66 WASH. L. REV. 623
(1991); Steven Mathew Wald, Note, The Left-for-Dead Fiction of Corporate "Presence" Is it
Revived by Burnham?, 54 LA. L. REV. 187 (1993). See generally Symposium, The Future of
PersonalJurisdiction:A Symposium on Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 559 (1991)
(providing criticism and support from an array of commentators); Borchers, supra note 37, at 19
(exploring the illogical and confusing historical roots of Burnham); Cox, supra note 4, at 497
(criticizing Burnham and arguing that transient jurisdiction is unconstitutional).
136. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 621; see also Irwin, supranote 4, at 613.
137. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 621. It is easy to point out that there is no difference between
Shaffer/Rush and Burnham, thereby undermining the latter case's tradition justification. The
earlier cases held that International Shoe had supplanted traditional rules for presence and
attachment (Shaffer) and Seider-style (Rush) jurisdiction. Under Burnham's return-to-tradition
reasoning, the Court should return to the pre-Shaffer and Rush era, a position it refused to
endorse in Burnham.
138. See generally R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, How the Supreme Court Is Dealing
With Precedents in Constitutional Cases, 62 BROOKLYN L. REV. 973 (1996) (identifying the
various views of the Justices concerning following precedent).
139. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-64 (1992) (discussing the
significance of tradition in fundamental rights cases, in overturning precedent, and the force of
stare decisis).
140. Many cite the confusing nature of jurisdiction as a reason for establishing bright-line
rules. However, it is confusing because facts change the circumstances under which it is
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If the Court sought justifiable reliance on tradition, it should
have delved into the underlying concepts that supported a forum's
General jurisdiction
traditional assertion of general jurisdiction.'
exists because once, under a different set of facts and precepts, it
struck courts as fundamentally fair.4 ' When American jurisdictional
jurisprudence first developed, people often lived their entire lives in
one place. Individuals would engage in substantially all their activities in that one forum. Under such circumstances, it was almost always reasonable for a forum to assert jurisdiction because that forum
supplied the most appropriate regulatory regime. It was where the
cause of action arose. Thus, general jurisdiction developed as a conceptual shorthand for fundamental fairness under a set of facts that
no longer exists. Today, people are mobile and spend time in many
fora. One's "residence" or "domicile" no longer accurately indicates
where a cause of action likely arose. In other words, the conceptual
shorthand no longer fits the identifiable set of facts that it originally
Unforserved. This illustrates the tyranny of verbal shorthand.'
tunately, Burnham has reinforced this tyranny. To bypass these legal
shorthands, litigants must seek an alternate route to ensure the
imposition of the proper regulatory regime.' This Note argues that

appropriate for a forum to assert jurisdiction. Rather than recognizing an ad hoc scheme of
constitutional protection, Burnham endorsed a black letter statement of the law. See generally
Irwin, supra note 4, at 624 (describing the majority opinion as "strong statements of 'black
letter' "); Paliotta, supranote 135, at 565 ('The advantage of Justice Scalia's [majority] opinion is
cerfainty.. .
141. The majority journeyed back to the 15th century to support the proposition that "the
judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is void." Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608 (citing Bowser v.
Collins, 145 Eng. Rep. 97 (Ex. Ch. 1482)). The opinion then cites a number of cases for support
in American jurisprudence. Yet it cited only Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), to support the
statement that "we have long relied on the principles traditionally followed by American courts
in marking out the territorial limits of each State's authority." Burnham, 495 U.S. at 609.
Burnham cited cases from the 18th and 19th century in support of the argument that transitory
jurisdiction is constitutional.
142. Support for this proposition comes from Burnham itself: 'That standard [of traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice] was developed by analogy to 'physical presence ....
Id. at 619.
143. Unfortunately, Western society lives under a system of verbal shorthand. See generally
McCoy, supra note 102. Professor McCoy, in a later article, cites Allstate Insurance. Co. v. Hague
to illustrate the problem of general jurisdiction and the failure of commentators to realize how it
was the Court's attempt to work within the confines of general jurisdiction that led to the much
criticized decision. See Maier 8 McCoy, supra note 4, at 287.
144. Justice Brennan, concurring in Burnham, 495 U.S. at 639 n.13 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment), explained that "a change of venue may be possible" so that "a
transient defendant can avoid protracted litigation of a spurious suit." He also explained that
"state court[s] ... [can apply] the doctrine of forum non conveniens." Id. See also Irwin, supra
note 4, at 641 ("It is ironic that the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens will allow a
court to do just what the Burnham decision will not; namely, to refuse to exercise personal
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forum non conveniens and the federal transfer statute provide that
avenue.
V. BUILING AN ALTERNATIVE AvENUE OF
PROTECTION-FoRuM NON CONVENIENS
Obtaining jurisdiction takes on increased significance in the
absence of constitutional fundamental fairness checks on a forum's
assertion of jurisdiction. Litigants must now operate within a world
that fails to recognize the importance of forum and the historical and
functional reasons for the creation of jurisdiction in the first place.
Fortunately, an alternative exists. The search for alternative avenues
after Burnham has led to increased prominence for forum non conveniens and the federal transfer statute.
Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine that allows a
court to dismiss a cause of action even though the forum may constitutionally assert jurisdiction. The doctrine allows courts to decline
otherwise sanctioned jurisdiction over a cause of action where the
convenience of the parties and witnesses, or the interests of justice,
would be better served by allowing the action to proceed in a different
forum.14 This section will trace the doctrine's development, reasoning,
and application.

jurisdiction based upon inadequate contacts with the forum state."). Of course, the other option is
to ignore Burnham, which some lower courts have done for jurisdiction over "present'
corporations. See, e.g., Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 180-82 (5th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting the plaintiffs assertion of jurisdiction based on the in-state service of process on a
corporate agent, reasoning that Burnham did not involve a corporation and did not decide any
issues pertaining to corporations); Demirs v. Plexicraft, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 250, 251-52 (D.R.I.
1990) (applying minimum contacts to an assertion of jurisdiction to a present corporation); MBM
Fisheries, Inc. v. Bollinger Mach. Shop & Shipyard, Inc., 804 P.2d 627, 629-31 (Wash. Ct. App.
1991) (granting the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because jurisdiction
relied solely on in-state service of corporate officers). But see Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Purex Indus.,
Inc., 576 A.2d 942, 944-45 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (reading Burnham to permit
jurisdiction on service of a present agent of a nonresident corporation). A recent Second Circuit
case imposed an additional reasonableness test in a case in which general jurisdiction through
minimum contacts had already been proven and acknowledged by the court. See Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 573-75 (2d Cir. 1996). The court ruled that
the defendant's contacts with the forum satisfied general jurisdictional requirements. See id. at
572-73. The court went on, however, to ascertain the reasonableness of jurisdiction under the
five Asahi factors. See id. at 568-69. In applying those factors, the court found that adjudication
in the forum served "absolutely no interest" of the forum and did not further the plaintiffs
"interests in proceeding in a convenient forum"; the court concluded that 'Florida, the locus of
the alleged tort, and New York, plaintiffs domicile, have far more significant interests in
resolving the dispute." Id. at 574-75. See generally Wald, supra note 135, at 187 (explaining
that presence should not be a basis for jurisdiction over corporations).
145. See Jennings v. Boeing Co., 660 F. Supp. 796, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
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Although scholars debate its origin, most recognize Scotland as
the birthplace of forum non conveniens. 141 In the United States, forum
non conveniens first surfaced in admiralty cases. 14' The Supreme
Court, in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, extended from admiralty to a
forum's assertion of general jurisdiction the concept that "a court may
resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is
authorized by the letter of a general venue statute... 8 Shortly after
the Court decided Gulf Oil, Congress codified and revised the common
law doctrine to allow transfers between federal district courts under
Today, in the federal judiciary forum non conveniens
§ 1404(a).'
applies only to cases where the alternative forum lies in another country." State courts, however, continue to apply the doctrine both in
law and in equity. 5' Although this Note concentrates on § 1404(a), the
federal transfer statute, its close relationship with forum non conveniens requires a preliminary discussion of that common law doctrine.

146. The Supreme Court, in American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 (1994), noted
that forum non conveniens first developed in Scottish estate cases. See Macmaster v. Macmaster,
11 Sess. Cas. 685, 687 (No. 280) (2d Div. Scot.) (1833); McMorine v. Cowie, 7 Sess. Cas. (2d ser.)
270, 272 (No. 48) (1st Div. Scot.) (1845); La Societe du Gaz de Paris v. La Societe Anonyme de
Navigation "Les Armateurs Francais," [1926] Sess. Cas. (H.L) 13 (1925); see also Edward L.
Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAL. L. REV. 380, 387 n.35 (1947) (citing
cases); Robert Braucher, Comment, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. REV. 908, 909
(1947); Harry Litman, Comment, Considerationsof Choice of Law in the Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens, 74 CAL. L. REV. 565, 567 n.11 (1986) ('The doctrine has its origins in several
Scottish cases in the nineteenth century, which used the term 'forum non competens' to dismiss
cases 'both where the court lacked jurisdiction and where it was not expedient for the due
administration of justice to hear the case.'") (citations omitted). But see Donald J. Carney,
Forum Non Conveniens in the United States and Canada,3 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 117, 119 n.9 (1996)
(noting that the origins of the doctrine are still murky).
147. See American Dredging Co., 510 U.S. at 449; see also The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 36566 (1885); The Maggie Hammond, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 435, 457 (1870). See generally, WARREN
FREEDMAN, FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS: THE DEFENSE OF FORUM NON
CONVENIENS (1988); Alexander M. Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Convenicns as Applied in
the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 CORNELL L. Q. 12 (1949); Paxton Blair, The
Doctrineof Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929); Carney,
supra note 146, at 121 n.16; Stewart, supra note 19, at 1270. The American version of the
doctrine differed from the English version, which required courts to be "satisfied, as a
prerequisite to assuming or taking jurisdiction in a conflict of law action, that the forum which
the plaintiff ha[d] chosen is an appropriate one for the determination of the action." Inglis, supra
note 121, at 382-83. In effect, this Note supports an American embodiment of the English rule
through the use of § 1404(a) transfers.
148. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947). See also Stewart, supra note 19, at
1259 n.3.
149. See infra note 182-86, and accompanying text.
150. For example, the Supreme Court utilized forum non conveniens and not § 1404(a) in
American Dredging Co., 510 U.S. at 453 and Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253
(1981), because the alternative forum was another country.
151. See American Dredging,510 U.S. at 453; infra note 184
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A. The "'Inconvenient"Forum
Traditionally, forum non conveniens allowed a defendant to
petition the trial court to dismiss a cause of action because the plaintiffs chosen forum was either inconvenient or inappropriate.5 ' Courts
deferred to the plaintiffs choice of forum and required the defendant
to show not just mere inconvenience but extreme inconvenience.1 "
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws announced that "[a]
state will not exercise jurisdiction if it is a seriously inconvenient
forum for the trial of the action provided that a more appropriate
forum is available to the plaintiff.""
The reasoning behind the doctrine is threefold. First, the doctrine protects defendants from litigating in far-away fora that have
little relation either to the parties or the underlying dispute."
Second, the doctrine protects state interests in avoiding undue burdens
on its citizens, taxpayers, and courts, which would have to bear the
costs of litigation unrelated to the forum." Finally, the doctrine pro-

152. See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS OF LAW 120-137 (1962); GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 16 (Scoles, 4th ed. 1964); Barrett, supra note 146, at 380; Braucher, supra note 146, at
908. For discussion on the role of forum non conveniens in the enforceability of forum selection
clauses in contract law, see Ranjit S. Dhindsa & Michael M. Ostrove, Forum Selection and
Forum Nonconveniens, 32 INT'L L. 232 (1998).
153. See infra note 188; see also Stewart, supranote 19, at 1268 (footnote omitted):
The major thrust of the Supreme Court opinion was two-fold: first, that the possibility of
a less-favorable body of substantive law governing is not a controlling or even substantial
factor in the analysis, which focuses instead upon issues of convenience; and second, that
the strong presumption in favor of the plaintiffs choice of forum is less forceful when the
real parties in interest are foreign, since the absence of those parties from the forum
weakens the presumption that the chosen forum is a convenient one.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 (1971). See Ann Alexander, Note,
Forum Non Conveniens in the Absence of an Alternative Forum, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1000, 1005
(1986) (stating that the Restatement is an accurate description of the law as it stands in
American jurisdictions).
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 cmt. a (1971), which explains:
Some of these forums may have little relation either to the parties or to the cause of
action, and suit in them may increase greatly the burden to the defendant of making a
defense. On occasion, a plaintiff will bring suit in such a forum in the belief that he may
there secure a larger or an easier recovery or in the hope that the inconvenience and
burden of making a defense will induce the defendant to enter a compromise, to contest
the case less strenuously, or to permit judgment to be entered against him by default.
The rule has been developed that a court, even though it has jurisdiction, will not
entertain the suit if it believes itself to be a seriously inconvenient forum provided that a
more appropriate forum is available to the plaintiff.
"Finally, in the forum non conveniens inquiry, the court focuses on such matters as the location
of evidence and of witnesses in order to assess the degree of actual difficulty litigating in the
chosen forum will impose." Stewart, supranote 19, at 1260.
156. The policies behind forum non conveniens include:
[Tihe state's interest in protecting its citizens and taxpayers from the undue expense and
congestion that may flow from burdening its courts with litigation having no connection
with the state [, and] the parties' interest in having litigation between them processed
conveniently and in a way most likely to yield a just result.
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tects the interests of justice by helping to ensure that the most appropriate forum exerts its regulatory authority by turning away those
causes of action not arising within the forum.'57 In other words, the
doctrine recognizes why forum matters and provides an avenue to
ensure the imposition of the proper regulatory regime. In Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, the United States Supreme Court illustrated how the
doctrine may be applied to effectuate these goals."8
B. The InappropriateForum-Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, a Virginia resident brought a cause
of action in a New York federal district against a Pennsylvania corporation based on a fire in Virginia.1 5' The defendant corporation was
"generally present" in both Virginia and New York." The plaintiff
sued in New York to take advantage of its favorable disposition towards plaintiffs." ' The defendant moved to dismiss the case on forum
non conveniens grounds. The defendant did not want to litigate in
New York for the same reasons that the plaintiff had chosen the
forum."2
The United States Supreme Court conceded that the New York
federal district court could assert jurisdiction over the defendant but
held that the court could resist imposition upon its jurisdiction under

FLEMING JAMES & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.28, at 107 (3d ed. 1985); see also
Carney, supra note 146, at 125-26 (explaining that the U.S. test for forum non conveniens
focuses on the interest of the forum and the burden a trial will place on a court and the
community).
157. In World-Wide Volkswagen and Shaffer, Justice Brennan emphasized that venue and
forum non conveniens principles could be used by defendants to transfer the litigation to a more
appropriate forum. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 312 n.21 (1980);
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 228 n.8 (1977).
158. The use of forum non conveniens to cure problems inherent in transient jurisdiction is
not new. Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134 (N.Y. 1817), may be the first instance of a U.S. court
using the doctrine to overcome the inappropriateness connected with transient jurisdiction. The
court dismissed a case brought by a British citizen for an alleged tort committed on a British
vessel on the high seas. See id. at 138. The New York court explained that the court must look
to the "circumstances of the case" to ascertain the propriety of extending jurisdiction. Id.
Scholars often cite the case as the earliest application of the forum non conveniens doctrine to
correct an early transient jurisdiction rule. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 110, at 305.
159. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 502-03 (1947).
160. The defendant corporation was organized under Pennsylvania law and qualified to do
business in both Virginia and New York. See id. at 503.
161. See id. at 502.
162. See generally Maier & McCoy, supra note 4, at 266-67 (explaining that plaintiffs go to
"great lengths to obtain a forum likely to select policies that will produce results more favorable
than those likely to obtain in other available fora, and defendants regularly resist such a forum
for precisely the same reasons that led the plaintiff to seek it").

20001

BYPASSING BURNHAM

the doctrine of forum non conveniens."' The Court explained that the
doctrine provides considerable discretion to a trial court to decide
whether it is the appropriate forum to adjudicate the dispute.' The
Court provided a list of private factors to consider:
relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. There may
also be questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained. The court
165
will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial.

The Court explained that a plaintiff may not choose an inconvenient
forum to "vex," "harass," or "oppress" the defendant." It held that a
court should disturb the plaintiffs choice of forum only when the
balance strongly favors the defendant."' Although the Court used
terms of physical convenience, a closer analysis of the case illustrates
that the Court was concerned not with the relative convenience to the
parties but rather the appropriateness of the forum attaching its legal
consequences to the actions of the parties."
The Court also explained that public interest notions have a
place in the application of the doctrine. It stated:
Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be
imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. In
cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in
their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of
it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a
forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having
a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to
itself.169

The Supreme Court upheld the district court's dismissal of the case
because the cause of action arose in Virginia. ° The Court held that

163. See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 504-05. Gulf Oil was decided on forum non conveniens grounds
because § 1404 was not yet in existence. In response to Gulf Oil, Congress passed § 1404 a year
later, in 1948. See An Act to revise, codify, and enact into law Title 28 of the United States Code
entitled "Judicial Code and Judiciary," Pub. L. No. 773, § 1404, 62 Stat. 869, 937 (1948).
164. See id. at 508 ("Wisely, it has not been attempted to catalogue the circumstances which
will justify or require either grant or denial of remedy. The doctrine leaves much to the
discretion of the court to which plaintiff resorts, and experience has not shown a judicial
tendency to renounce one's own jurisdiction so strong as to result in many abuses.").
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 509-11.
169. Id. at 508-09.
170. See id. at 512.
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Virginia, not New York, provided the proper regulatory regime.' The
federal court in New York did not deem its regulation of activities in
Virginia appropriate. The Supreme Court's affirmance clearly recognized the importance of forum. It explicitly acknowledged that forum
is more than just a physical location-it embodies a state's regulatory
machinery.
C. Using Forum Non Conveniens to Ensure the AppropriateForum
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Burnham, some commentators believed that the doctrine of forum non conveniens had
outlived its usefulness.1"
If a litigant could seek constitutional
fundamental fairness protection from all assertions of jurisdiction, the
public and private factors articulated in Gulf Oil would already have
come to bear on the venue question."' After Burnham, however,
forum non conveniens and § 1404(a) surfaced as perhaps the only way
to protect litigants from a forum's assertion of general jurisdiction." '

171. See id. at 509-11. The Court concluded that the
task of the trial court would be simplified by trial in Virginia. If trial was in a state
court, it could apply its own law to events occurring there. If in federal court by reason of
diversity of citizenship, the court would apply the law of its own state in which it is likely
to be experienced. The course of adjudication in New York federal court might be beset
with conflict of laws problems all avoided if the case is litigated in Virginia where it
arose.
Id. at 511-12.
172. See Stewart, supra note 19, at 1263-64.
173. See id. Stewart wrote that
[t)he personal jurisdiction inquiry ought to take into account what courts in the context of
forum non conveniens refer to as the 'private factors,' those factors that relate to the
burden imposed on the litigants by the plaintiffs choice of forum. Many cases dismissed
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens should thus be dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.
Id. The author also noted that "[i]f the jurisdictional analysis were properly undertaken, use of
the common law doctrine would no longer be necessary to assure a convenient forum." Id. at
1271. But see Litman, supra note 146, at 567 n.1 ('The modern law of forum non conveniens
has developed in part in response to changes in the law of personal jurisdiction, which have
exposed defendants to potential hardship and contributed to an enormous increase in judicial
business.').
Some commentators have questioned the continued viability of forum non
conveniens and the federal transfer statute. "When the forum chosen by the plaintiff lacks
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, of course, forum non conveniens is not a relevant issue;
the suit will be dismissed for lack of that jurisdiction." Stewart, supra note 19, at 1321. After
Burnham, forum non conveniens and the federal transfer statute are perhaps the only way to
temper the injustice of general jurisdiction.
174. See generally Alan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of CourtAccess Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781 (1985) (pointing out that forum non conveniens doctrine
offers a route of judicial escape from the exercise of general jurisdiction when the forum has no
relationship to the cause of action). Some lower courts have also made this observation. In
Lehman v. Humphrey Cayman, Ltd., 713 F.2d 339, 344, 347 (8th Cir. 1983), the Eighth Circuit
held that the factors used in forum non conveniens analysis already appeared in its public
interest analysis and its concern for fairness in its jurisdictional analysis, thus making the forum
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In fact, after Burnham, many commentators predicted the resurrection of forum non conveniens as a means to avoid the unfairness
caused by a forum's assertion of general jurisdiction. "5 Such predictions echoed forty-year-old concerns about the need to temper the
dogmatic rule of personal service created by Pennoyer and not completely overruled by InternationalShoe.75 In fact, forum non conveniens helped the Supreme Court shape its test for constitutional fundamental fairness jurisdiction."' Through forum non conveniens, courts
are able to place cases in those fora that actually have specific jurisdiction. 8 Some even argue that forum non conveniens and § 1404(a)
provide better avenues for both the plaintiff and the defendant than
the constitutional jurisdictional route.'

non conveniens motion redundant. Some commentators have concluded that forum non
conveniens masks the reality of jurisdictional disease by treating symptoms rather than root
causes. See Cox, supra note 13, at 18 n.32. Others have criticized the doctrine as a waste of
judicial resources by clogging the court with worthless motions and protracted litigation. See
Stewart, supra note 19, at 1324. One author explains the overlap between subject matter
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, venue, and forum non conveniens. See Stein, supra, at 781.
Stein concluded that a doctrine of "forum conveniens" is warranted, either under the rubric of
personal jurisdiction or the rubric of subject matter jurisdiction. See id.
175. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.10, at 150 (3d
ed. 1986) ('CTo some extent, the evils of utilizing transient presence to confer judicial jurisdiction
can be avoided by extension of the doctrine of forum non conveniens."); Albright, supranote 22,
at 383 n.162 ("[A]ny justification of transient jurisdiction includes a strong doctrine of forum non
conveniens to relieve situations of substantial inconvenience.'); Linda Silberman, Reflections on
Burnham v. Superior Court: Toward Presumptive Rules of Jurisdiction and Implications for
Choice of Law, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 569, 576 (1991) ("[T]he retention of physical presence makes
practical sense, particularly where discretionary doctrines of forum non conveniens are available
to alleviate serious hardship in situations where there is an alternative forum.") (footnote
omitted).
176. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 110, at 292 (explaining that forum non conveniens
developed to constrain the dogmatic rule of personal service created by the Pennoyer
requirement); see also Associated Mills, Inc. v. Rush-Hampton Indus., Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1164,
1165 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ('In the days before enactment of Section 1404(a), the judicially-created
doctrine of forum non conveniens was the courts' only vehicle to moderate the sometimes-unfair
effects of the expansion of in personam jurisdiction wrought by International Shoe and its
progeny.') (citation omitted).
177. See Weintraub, supranote 49, at 539 (explaining that Asahi elevated the factors usually
associated with forum non conveniens to a constitutional status).
178. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 175, at § 4.33 ("In view of the great expansion of bases for
judicial jurisdiction, in many states to the full constitutional limits, forum non conveniens is an
increasingly important tool with which courts can fashion wise decisions on the exercise of
jurisdiction."); William L. Reynolds, The Proper Forum for a Suit: TransnationalForum Non
Conveniens and Counter-Suit Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1663, 1710-11
(1992) (explaining that forum non conveniens "permits the court to search for a better home for
the litigation" and helps the court to "place the case where it really belongs"); see also Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 483-85 (1985) (stating that procedural mechanisms other
than finding jurisdiction unconstitutional may be employed to render jurisdiction inconvenient).
179. See, e.g., Albright, supra note 22, at 396-97. The author concluded that "[t]he forum non
conveniens doctrine provides a mechanism for courts to reach a desired result in hard cases
without distorting personal jurisdiction doctrine." Id. at 399. However, some commentators
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In deciding forum non conveniens motions, trial court judges
retain broad discretion in applying the private and public factors
enumerated in Gulf Oil1" to the facts of a particular case.18"' The common law doctrine, however, has its faults. First, because it requires a
showing of extreme inconvenience, defendants might not meet this
high burden despite the existence of a more appropriate forum. Second, courts may be reluctant to grant the motion because it requires
outright dismissal of the case. In response, Congress, in 1948, codified
and revised the doctrine when it created § 1404(a), the federal transfer
statute.lu

VI. THE FEDERAL TRANSFER STATUTE
Section 1404(a)'" supersedes the doctrine of forum non conveniens in federal courts"u when the alternative venue is another

argue that forum non conveniens and the federal transfer statute are actually responsible for the
inadequacies of jurisdictional rules because they allow courts to avoid difficult questions posed
by due process. See David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in American and England: "A
Rather FantasticFiction,"103 L. Q. REV. 398, 430 (1987) (advocating "clear jurisdictional rules,
coupled with very limited forum non conveniens ...discretion"); Stein, supranote 174, at 845-46
(arguing that "a transformation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens into a doctrine of forum
conveniens would cure many of the defects in the current doctrine and would represent a rational
development of the law"); see also Hay, supranote 129, at 601 n.65, 603 n.76 ('The possibility of
a forum-non-conveniens dismissal does not justify retention of transient jurisdiction .... The
forum-non-conveniens doctrine is an uncertain and unreliable corrective mechanism.").
180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 84 cmt. C (1971) (incorporating the
public and private interests from Gulf Oil); see also Alexander, supra note 154, at 1003 n.20
(explaining that the factors enumerated in comment C are nothing more than a lengthy direct
quotation from Gulf Oil); Stewart, supra note 19, at 1259 n.3 (citing the factors discussed in Gulf
Oil as those justifying dismissal under forum non conveniens).
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § 84 cmt. B (1971) (explaining that
application of forum non conveniens "depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is
in the sound discretion of the trial judge").
182. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 473 (describing § 1404(a) as an expansive
embodiment of forum non conveniens); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 cmt.
E (1971) ("A transfer under § 1404(a) may be granted in situations which would not justify
dismissal of the case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.").
183. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1994) & Supp. 111 (1997) provides:
(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought
(b) Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any action, suit or proceeding of a
civil nature or any motion or hearing thereof, may be transferred, in the discretion of
the court, from the division in which pending to any other division in the same
district. Transfer of proceedings in rem brought by or on behalf of the United States
may be transferred under this section without the consent of the United States where
all other parties request transfer
(c) A district court may order any civil action to be tried at any place within the division
in which it is pending
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federal court."s Congress "drafted [§ 1404(a)] in accordance with the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even though the venue is proper."'" s
Congress
attempted to eliminate the inequities of common law forum non conveniens s7 by requiring a lesser showing of "inconvenience" and
M
providing for transfer to an alternative forum instead of dismissal."

(d) As used in this section, the term "district court" includes the District Court of Guam,
the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, and the District Court of the
Virgin Islands, and the term "district" includes the territorial jurisdiction of each such
court.
Section 1404(a) is not the first instance of a transfer statute designed to counteract the flaws of
general jurisdiction. For example, originally, in English law, all actions had to be brought in a
forum connected with the cause of action "because the Jury was to come from where the fact was
committed." R. BOOTE, AN HISTORICAL TREATISE OF AN ACTION OR SUIT AT LAW 97 (4th ed. 1805);
see also Ehrenzweig, supra note 110, at 300-01. As practices changed, the plaintiff was permitted
to sue in places other than where the events giving rise to the cause of action occurred. This led
to a 1382 statute that forced plaintiffs to commence writs of account and debt in the county
where the contract had been made. 6 RICH. 2., c.2 (1382); Ehrenzweig, supra note 110, at 301.
Later, and in response to a statute of 1705 that allowed plaintiffs to lay transitory actions in any
county, "courts began to grant motions for such changes of venue to the place of the cause of
action as 'motions of course."' Ehrenzweig, supra note 110, at 301; see BOOTE, supra,at 154.
184. States still use forum non conveniens. See David E. Steinberg, The Motion to Transfer
and the Interests of Justice, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 443, 444 n.6 (1990) (collecting state cases).
The American Law Institute/Commissioners on Uniform State Law has attempted to draft a
state-level statute that mirrors the federal transfer statute. See UNIFORM TRANSFER OF LITIG.
ACT (Proposed Official Draft 1991) (allowing transfer between the courts of different states and
nations that have adopted the act). Some states have enacted statutes along the lines of §
1404(a) that require the existence of an alternative forum before a court may dismiss a suit. See
Alexander, supra note 154, at 1004; see also David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to
State Courts in Transnational Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit
Injunctions, 68 TEX. L. REV. 937, 950-51 (1990) (noting that thirty-two states and the District of
Columbia have adopted the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens).
185. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 571 U.S. 706, 722 (1996); Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981); see also Albright, supranote 22, at 358.
186. H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at 8 (1947). The House Report also explained that "[t]he new
subsection requires the court to determine that the transfer is necessary for convenience of the
parties and witnesses, and further, that it is in the interest of justice to do so." Id.; see Norwood
v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 34-35 (1954) (Clark, J., dissenting) (explaining that courts may look
to forum non conveniens to interpret the statute); Parette v. Lockhart, 927 F.2d 366, 367 n.2 (8th
Cir. 1991) (noting that the magistrate judge "could have transferred the petition to a district
court in Louisiana on forum non conveniens grounds'); Brockman v. Sun Valley Resorts, Inc.,
923 F. Supp. 1176, 1178 (D. Minn. 1996) (explaining that courts consider 1404(a) motions as
forum non conveniens motions); O'Brien v. Goldstar Tech., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 383, 385 (W.D.N.Y.
1993) (explaining that § 1404(a) is a statutory recognition of the common law doctrine of forum
non conveniens); see also Norwood, 349 U.S. at 32; Fine v. McGuire, 433 F.2d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir.
1970). But see All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011 (3d Cir. 1952) (arguing
that courts improperly limit § 1404(a) with Supreme Court forum non conveniens jurisprudence:
"Like many another well-intentioned procedural improvement, this one is in a fair way to be
defeated by judicial construction).
187. See Michael B. Rodden, Is 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) a FederalForum-ShoppingStatute?, 66
WASH. L. REV. 851, 854 (1991).
188. See Norwood, 349 U.S. at 32 ("Congress, by the term 'for convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice,' intended to permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser
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The defendant must show that a "transfer is in the best interests of
the litigation."' "
The statute provides greater discretion to trial
judges in making this determination" and increases the number of
judicial districts to which litigants can legitimately seek transfer.'9'
A. DeterminingAppropriateFora
Section 1404(a) provides four factors to guide district courts in
ruling on transfer motions: (1) convenience of the parties, (2) convenience of the witnesses, (3) interests of justice, and (4) whether the case
could have been brought in the proposed transferee forum. 9' Although
mentioned last, courts usually resolve the question of "where the case
might have been brought" first, as it can be dispositive. The Supreme
Court explained that this inquiry concentrates on whether the plain-

showing of inconvenience.); O'Brien, 812 F. Supp. at 385 (observing that the statutory burden on
the defendant is less stringent than forum non conveniens since it results in transfer not
dismissal); Paragon-Revolute Corp. v. C. F. Pease Co., 120 F. Supp. 488, 490 (D. Del. 1954)
("[D]isturbing [a] plaintiffs choice of forum is no longer a rarity because of [Section] 1404(a)defendant's mandatory margin for victory, then, need not be an overwhelming one."); see also
Stewart, supra note 19, at 1279 n.77. However, many district courts apply factors and language
identical to those used at common law. See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. MCI
Communications Corp., 736 F. Supp. 1294, 1305-13 (D.N.J. 1990) (employing the public and
private interests announced in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 235 (1947), in ruling on a §
1404(a) transfer motion); Sandvik v. Continental Ins. Co., 724 F. Supp. 303, 307 (D.N.J. 1989)
(same); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Lichtenberger, No. 88-6623, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8724,
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1989) (borrowing the notion of judicial economy from forum non
conveniens for its § 1404(a) analysis); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Landry, 677 F. Supp. 704,
709-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (applying common law forum non conveniens principles to a § 1404(a)
motion). See also Stein, supranote 174, at 807 (noting that "annotations to § 1404 refer to it as a
codification of the forum non conveniens doctrine").
189. Eskofot A/S v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 872 F. Supp. 81, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(quoting Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co., 725 F. Supp. 1314, 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). See Linzer v.
EMI Blackwood Music, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 207, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (to the same effect); Star
Lines, Ltd. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 442 F. Supp. 1201, 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(same); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
908 (1979) (same); see also American Littoral Society v. EPA, 943 F. Supp. 548, 550 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (balancing public and private interests); O'Brien, 812 F. Supp. at 385 (explaining that the
court considers both the interest of the litigants and the public interest); Lisa Rouchell,
Comment, Federal Question Jurisdiction:Must a Defendant Have Minimum Contacts with the
State Whose Long-Arm Statute Is Used to Serve Process?, 54 LA. L. REV. 407, 432 n.182 (1993)
(collecting cases).
190. See Norwood, 349 U.S. at 31-32 (observing that § 1404(a) was more than just a
codification of forum non conveniens, rather, Congress intended to grant broad power to district
court judges); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1515 (10th Cir.
1991) (explaining that § 1404(a) revised forum non conveniens and granted more discretion to
trial court judges); see also PiperAircraft, 454 U.S. at 253; Howe v. Goldcorp Inv., Ltd., 946 F.2d
944, 947 (1st Cir. 1991), cert denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992).
191. See Kelner, supranote 19, at 613.
192. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994); American Littoral Soc'y, 943 F. Supp. at 550.
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tiff, independent of the defendant's wishes, might have brought the
suit in that forum. 9' According to the Court, this inquiry should not
narrow the range of permissible federal fora beyond those permitted
by federal venue statutes.1 4 Lower courts have elaborated on this
requirement. 9 ' For example, the Third Circuit interpreted the fourth
factor as: "where [the suit] might have been brought by all remaining
non-settling parties,"" while the Ninth Circuit held that transfer to a
given forum is appropriate if the defendant could have filed suit there
and the plaintiffs claim could have been raised as a permissive
counterclaim.' 7
That courts first look to whether the cause of action might have
been brought in the proposed transferee forum illustrates that the
statute-and a court applying it-is concerned with something other
than physical convenience.
It shows that, at some level, both
Congress and the courts fear the imposition of an improper regulatory
regime; for, regardless of how convenient a forum may be, if it lacks
the proper regulatory authority to adjudicate the underlying dispute,
then the case may not be transferred to it.
B. Findingthe Most AppropriateForum
After determining whether the cause of action might have been
brought in the proposed transferee forum, courts turn their attention
to the remaining three statutory requirements. The application of
these apparently simple factors has spawned a tremendous amount of
litigation.'99 Despite the large number of cases, neither the Supreme

193. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1960).
194. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964).
195. See generally In re Warrick, 70 F.3d 736, 739 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Copley, 25
F.3d 660, 662 (8th Cir. 1994); Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble, Denton & Assocs., Inc., 5 F.3d 28, 33 (3d
Cir. 1993); Landmark Land Co., Inc. v. OTS, 948 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 1991).
196. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 819 (3d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S.
1156 (1983).
197. See A. J. Indus., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 503 F.2d
384, 387-88 (9th Cir. 1974).
198. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 44, at 165 (2d ed. 1970) ("Section
1404(a) has given rise to a veritable flood of litigation. Probably no issue of civil procedure gives
rise to so many reported decisions, year after year, as does this seemingly simple statute.");
Steinberg, supra note 31, at 1481 n.6 ("Defendant transfer motions occur in almost one of every
twenty federal cases."); Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 1526-29 (illustrating the
growing number of transfer motions; speculating that as many as ten thousand transfer motions
may be made each year); Steinberg, supra note 184, at 446 n.11 (citing evidence that "[t]he
roughly 3,700 § 1404 transfers ordered in 1988-89 represent a more than 100% increase from the
roughly 1,700 annual transfers ordered ten years earl[ier]"); see also Steinberg, supra note 31, at
1515-50 (collecting and summarizing published transfer motion decisions between 1992 and
1994); Kelner, supranote 19, at 614 (collecting cases). Some have commented that this increase
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Court nor the legal community has paid the statute much attention.1
District courts, therefore, have been almost solely responsible' for the
development of the factors and standards for § 1404(a) transfers."'
While many commentators view this situation as a weakness of §
1404(a),"2° ad hoc, "appropriateness" analysis developed by those
closest to the case best effectuates the purpose and policy of § 1404(a).
Section 1404(a) attempts to prevent the waste of time and protect the various interests of the parties."°' Congress designed § 1404(a)
to provide trial judges with discretion "to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an 'individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.' ,,0 A court may transfer a case at any time
during its pendency."'O Although federal courts do not liberally grant

of motions "[p]erhaps ... reflects a growing need for the transfer device." Clermont & Eisenberg,
supra note 22, at 1526. In any event, the widespread litigation of transfer motions offers
conclusive proof that forum matters, at least to the parties with a stake in the matter.
199. See Steinberg, supranote 184, at 446 ("The Supreme Court rarely has addressed section
1404 transfers, and... Illegal scholars have ignored the motion to transfer.').
200. This fact should not suggest that district courts alone have power to issue transfers.
The United States Supreme Court, in Koehring Co. v. Hyde Contruction Co., 382 U.S. 362, 365
(1966), held that § 1404(a) does not preclude appellate courts from issuing transfer orders.
Appellate courts may order transfer sua sponte. See infra note 207; Jumara v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 55 F.3d 873, 884 (3d Cir. 1995) (Garth, J., dissenting).
201. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 184, at 446 ("CTlhe development of proper standards to
govern the transfer of cases has been left to the lower federal courts, and almost exclusively to
the district courts.'). The author explained, however, that the lower courts have "not provided
any meaningful standards to govern the section 1404 transfer." Id. at 487.
202. See, e.g., id. at 446 (concluding that as a result of the "ad hoc balancing employed by the
district courts," this body of law is in chaos).
203. See Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 853 F. Supp. 174, 175 (D. Md. 1994); see
also Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (explaining that "the purpose of the section
is to prevent the waste 'of time, energy and money' and 'to protect litigants, witnesses and the
public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense"') (quoting Continental Grain Co. v.
Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26, 27 (1960).
204. Stewart Org., v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen, 376 U.S. 622);
see In re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp., 980 F.2d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 1992) ("iMiotions for transfer lie
within the broad discretion of the district court[s] and are determined upon notions of
convenience and fairness on a case-by-case basis."); see also Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55
F.3d 873, 883 (3d Cir. 1995); Minnette v. Time Warner, 997 F.2d 1023, 1026 (2d Cir. 1993); Lony
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 886 F.2d 628, 632 (3d Cir. 1989); Jarvis Christian College v.
Exxon Corp., 845 F.2d 523, 528 & n.22 (5th Cir. 1988); Hubbard v. White, 755 F.2d 692, 694 (8th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 834 (1985); Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Marine OfficeAppleton & Cox Corp., 579 F.2d 561, 567 (10th Cir. 1978); Ashmore v. Northeast Petroleum Div.
of Cargill, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 36, 38 (D. Me. 1996); Wine Mkts. Int'l, Inc. v. Bass, 939 F. Supp.
178, 181 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Linzer v. EMI Blackwood Music, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 207, 216 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); American Cynamid Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 903 F. Supp. 781, 786 (D.N.J. 1995); Hill's Pet
Prod. v. A.S.U., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 774, 776 (D. Kan. 1992); Midwest Motor Supply Co. v. Kimball,
761 F. Supp. 1316, 1318 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
205. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1516 (10th Cir.
1991).
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transfers,' they have on occasion issued § 1404(a) transfer orders sua
sponte when the interests of justice so demanded.'
Courts evaluate the merits of § 1404(a) transfer motions on a
flexible and individualized basis that balances a number of casespecific factors.' It is notably similar to the process by which courts
determine special jurisdiction. Although some generalizations may be
made based on transfer determinations,' courts have not catalogued
the circumstances that justify or require grant or denial of transfer. ' °
Rather, such decisions are left to the sound discretion of trial judges."'
The case-by-case nature of transfer determinations, however, can
make predictions about the success of such motions difficult. "
Reviewing reported decisions illuminates a number of frequently-considered factors that can help courts reach sound resolutions of these case-by-case inquiries. The number of factors grows
each year, as judges use the verbal short-hand developed by their
predecessors to describe the reasons why, in their ad hoc value judg-

206. See, e.g., American Cynamid Co., 903 F. Supp. at 786; Kielcynski v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 837 F. Supp. 687 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
207. See, e.g., I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. Becher, 343 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 1965) (arguing
the validity of sua sponte transfer even though "[n]o reported case has been found in which it has
been specifically declared that [§ 1404(a)] authorizes a court to transfer a case to another district
on its own motion"); Kearney v. Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milling Mach. Co., 254 F. Supp. 130,
133-34 (N.D. IM. 1966) (issuing transfer sua sponte).
208. See Stewart Org., Inc., 487 U.S. at 29 (quoting Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 622); Patel v.
Howard Johnson Franchise Syss., Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1099, 1101 (M.D. Ala. 1996); O'Brien v.
Goldstar Tech., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 383, 385 (W.D.N.Y. 1993); Red Bull Assocs. v. Best Western
Int'l, Inc., 862 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1988); Terra Int'l, Inc. v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 922 F.
Supp. 1334, 1357 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Chrysler Credit Corp., 928 F.2d at 1516; see also Koster v.
American Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 528 (1947) ("Each case turns on its facts.');
FTC v. MacArthur, 532 F.2d 1135, 1143 (7th Cir. 1976) (same); American Cynamid Co., 903 F.
Supp. at 786; Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 853 F. Supp. 174, 175 (D. Md. 1994).
209. See Albright, supra note 22, at 359 (explaining that despite "an ad hoc collection of
result-oriented decisions, some generalizations can be made"); Robertson, supra note 179, at 415
(noting that "seemingly indistinguishable cases have far too often yielded diametrically opposite
results"); Stein, supranote 174, at 785 (describing the state of the law as "a crazy quilt of ad hoc,
capricious, and inconsistent decisions").
210. See Brown v. Woodring, 174 F. Supp. 640, 644 (D.C. Pa. 1959); Ashmore v. Northeast
Petroleum Div. of Cargill, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 36, 38 (D. Me. 1996) (quoting 15 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3827, at 368 (2d ed. 1986)).
211. See, e.g., Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp., 408 F.2d 16, 20 (9th Cir. 1969); Brown, 174 F.
Supp. at 644.
212. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994) ("[florum non conveniens
cannot really be relied upon in making decisions about secondary conduct-in deciding, for
example, where to sue or where one is subject to being sued. The discretionary nature of the
doctrine, combined with the multifariousness of the factors relevant to its application.., make
uniformity and predictability of outcome almost impossible.') (citations omitted). However, this
"flexible and multifaceted analysis [conforms with how] Congress intended to govern motions to
transfer within the federal system." Stewart Org., Inc., 487 U.S. at 31.
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ment, the facts warrant transfer to a more appropriate forum. " Many
courts begin their transfer analysis by listing those factors applicable
To understand and
to the particular set of facts before them. "
evaluate how § 1404(a) can provide protection to litigants against a
forum's assertion of general jurisdiction, a brief glance at these factors
is necessary.

213. See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. MCI Communications Corp., 736 F. Supp. 1294, 1305
(D.N.J. 1990) (noting the flexibility of § 1404(a) factors); Sandvik v. Continental Ins. Co., 724 F.
Supp. 303, 307 (D.N.J. 1989) ('There appears to be no limit to the number of factors a federal
court may consider in connection with a motion to transfer venue under section 1404(a).');
Eastern Scientific Mktg., Inc. v. Tekna-Seal, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 173, 180 n.13 (E.D. Va. 1988)
(identifying twenty different factors that may be relevant to a transfer motion); see also JAMES
W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 10.345[5], at 4362-63 (2d ed. 1991) ("The
combination and weight of factors ... cannot be catalogued.'); Kelner, supra note 19, at 614-15
('The already large number of factors used to gauge the appropriateness of a transfer grows each
year, keeping pace with the ever increasing number of transfer motions filed by litigants.');
Annotation, Questions as to Convenience and Justice of Transfer UnderForum Non Conveniens
Provision of Judicial Code (28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)), 1 A.L.R. FED. 15, 37-38 (1969) (identifying 16
different factors relevant to a transfer motion).
214. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1516 (10th Cir.
1991) (listing: plaintiffs choice of forum; accessibility of witnesses and other sources of proof,
including the availability of compulsory process to ensure attendance of witnesses; the cost of
making the necessary proof; the enforceability of a judgment, if obtained; relative advantages
and obstacles to a fair trial; difficulties that may arise from congested dockets; the possibility of
conflict of laws questions arising-, the advantage of having a local court determine questions of
local law; and all other considerations of a practical nature that make a trial easy, expeditious
and economical); Wine Mkts. Int'l, Inc. v. Bass, 939 F. Supp. 178, 181 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(considering: (1) convenience of the parties, (2) convenience of the witnesses, (3) relative means of
the parties, (4) locus of operative facts and relative ease of access to sources of proof, (5)
attendance of witnesses, (6) the weight accorded the plaintiffs choice of forum, (7) calendar
congestion, (8) the desirability of having the case tried by the forum familiar with the
substantive law to be applied, (9) practical difficulties, and (10) how best to serve the interest of
justice, based on an assessment of the totality of material circumstances); Hill's Pet Prods. v.
A.S.U., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 774, 776 (D. Kan. 1992) (citing Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Ritter, 371
F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir. 1967)) (evaluating plaintiffs choice of forum, the accessibility of
witnesses and other sources of proof including the availability of compulsory process to ensure
attendance of witnesses, the cost of making the necessary proof, the enforceability of a judgment
if obtained, relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial, difficulties that may arise from
congested dockets, the possibility of conflict of laws issues, the advantage of having a local court
determine questions of local law, and all other considerations of a practical nature); Don King
Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 735 F. Supp. 522, 533-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)) (reviewing: (1) the place where
the operative facts occurred, (2) convenience of the parties, (3) convenience of witnesses, (4)
relative ease of access to sources of proof, (5) availability of process to compel attendance of
unwilling witnesses, (6) plaintiffs choice of forum, (7) the forum's familiarity with governing law,
and (8) trial efficiency and the interests of justice); United Sonics, Inc. v. Shock, 661 F. Supp.
681, 682-83 (W.D. Tex. 1986) (considering availability and convenience of witnesses and parties,
location of counsel, location of books and records, cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses and
other trial expenses, place of the alleged wrong, possibility of delay and prejudice if transfer is
granted, and the plaintiffs choice of forum).
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After Congress passed the federal transfer statute in 1948, district courts looked to the factors 15 enumerated by the Supreme Court
in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert for guidance in making transfer determinations. In fact, many courts still use only those factors in making
§ 1404(a) determinations. 1 ' However, most courts, while borrowing
from Gulf Oil, have categorized the factors according to the threeprong statutory standard: convenience to parties, convenience to witnesses, and the interests of justice.
1. Convenience to the Parties
Courts look to a number of different factors in evaluating the
convenience to the parties. The plaintiffs choice of forum usually
comes first, but courts often afford differing weight to this choice." 7
Many trial judges will not disturb a plaintiffs choice unless the defendant offers clear proof that weighs in the defendant's favor."' Courts

215. The court, in O'Brien v. Goldstar Technology, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 383, 385 (W.D.N.Y.
1993), provided a summary of these interests. Private interests include: (1) plaintiffs initial
choice of forum, (2) convenience of the parties and the witnesses, (3) relative ease of access to
sources of proof, (4) availability of compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses, (5) the
location of relevant documents and other tangible evidence, (6) the enforceability of a judgment,
if obtained, and (7) "all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and
inexpensive." Id. (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); see also Calavo v.
Generali Belgium, 632 F.2d 963, 966-67 (2d Cir. 1980)). The public interests include:
"administrative difficulties that follow from court congestion, a local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home, and the appropriateness of having the trial of a diversity case in a
forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the action." Id.; see also American
Cynamid Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 903 F. Supp. 781, 787 (D.N.J. 1995) (citing the private and public
interests from Gulf Oil).
216. See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 962 F.2d 77, 80 (1st Cir.
1992) (using factors from Gulf Oil); Moore v. Telfon Communications Corp., 589 F.2d 959, 968
(9th Cir. 1978) (same); Technitrol, Inc. v. McManus, 405 F.2d 84, 86 (8th Cir. 1968) (same);
Brockman v. Sun Valley Resorts, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (D. Minn. 1996) (same); American
Cynamid Co., 903 F. Supp. at 786 ('IThe court must look to the factors enumerated by the
Supreme Court in Gulf Oil v. Gilbert."); Ricoh Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 473, 479-80
(D.N.J. 1993) (same); see also Edmund W. Kitch, Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code: In the
Interest of Justice or Injustice?, 40 IND. L.J. 99, 132 (1965) ("Apparently the district courts have
followed the lead of Moore's FEDERAL PRACTICE, which lists the factors discussed in Gulf Oil as
controlling 'Grounds for Transfer under § 1404(a).'").
217. See generally 15 CHARLES WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3848
(1982) (explaining that "courts have developed a bewildering variety of formulations on how
much weight is to be given to plaintiffs choice of forum"); Kelner, supra note 19, at 619-21 &
nn.33-40 (collecting numerous cases illustrating the range of cases from those that afford very
little weight to those that afford substantial weight to the plaintiffs choice of forum).
218. See Filmline (Cross-Country) Prods., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 865 F.2d 513, 521'(2d
Cir. 1989); Howell v. Tanner, 650 F.2d 610, 616 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918
(1982); William A. Smith Contracting Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 467 F.2d 662, 664 (10th Cir.
1972); Linzer v. EMI Blackwood Music, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 207, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Hubbell Inc.
v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 955, 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

354

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:311

frequently look to the underlying reasons for both the plaintiffs and
the defendant's preference. 19 If the plaintiff resides in the forum or
the cause of action arose in the forum, courts regularly afford greater
deference to the plaintiffs choice than if the plaintiffs chosen forum
Some courts examine
bears no relationship to the cause of action.'
the convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative physical
and financial condition!' and rarely order transfer if it merely shifts
Still others attempt to
inconvenience from one party to the other.'
balance all convenience factors' or to maximize the convenience of all
Others consider which party filed
parties and witnesses involved.'
firste' or the parties' contractual choice of forum."e Courts balance
some or all of these factors in determining convenience to the parties.
2. Convenience of the Witnesses and Access to Evidence
After considering the convenience of the parties, courts look to
the convenience of the witnesses. They assign considerable weight to
the location of material witnesses. 7 In determining the convenience

219. See, e.g., Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995) (weighing
plaintiffs preference and defendant's preference).
220. See infra notes 298-301, and accompanying text.
221. See Jumara,55 F.3d at 879.
222. See O'Brien v. Goldstar Tech., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 383, 386 (W.D.N.Y. 1993); De Luxe
Game Corp. v. Wonder Prods. Co., 166 F. Supp. 56, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
223. The Tenth Circuit, in Scheidt v. Klein, 956 F.2d 963, 965 (10th Cir. 1992), described this
balance of "convenience" as (1) location of the majority of witnesses, (2) location of pertinent
documentary evidence, (3) place in which conduct complained of occurred, (4) which forum's
substantive law applies to the conduct complained of, and (5) whether the balance of factors
indicates that the proposed transferee district is the less expensive and more convenient forum
for litigation. Thus, convenience does not mean simply physical convenience of the parties but
includes any notion of convenience that an ad hoc value judgment as to the more appropriate
forum might involve.
224. See, e.g., Kirschner Bros. Oil, Inc. v. Pannill, 697 F. Supp. 804, 807 (D. Del. 1988).
225. See Terra Int'l, Inc. v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 922 F. Supp. 1334, 1357 (N.D. Iowa
1996).
226. Many courts recognize the contractual choice of forum as a "significant" factor. See, e.g.,
Sunshine Beauty Supplies, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 872 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir. 1989).
However, others, including the Supreme Court, observe that forum selection clauses should not
receive "dispositive consideration." Stewart Org., v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30-31 (1988);
Jumara,55 F.3d at 880; Brock v. Entre Computer Ctrs., Inc., 933 F.2d 1253, 1257-58 (4th Cir.
1991); Moses v. Business Card Express, Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1136 (6th Cir. 1991).
227. See Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879; Hernandez v. Graebel Van Lines, 761 F. Supp. 983, 988
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that the location of witnesses is a major factor in considering transfer
motions); Arrow Elecs., Inc. v. Ducommun, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 264, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("In most
cases, the convenience of the party and non-party witnesses is the most important factor in the
decision whether to grant a motion for transfer.'); Cambridge Filter Corp. v. International Filter
Co., 548 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (D. Nev. 1982) (explaining that the convenience of witnesses is the
primary concern in deciding transfer motions); Supco Automotive Parts, Inc. v. Triangle Auto
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to the witnesses, courts weigh the nature and materiality of testimony
expected from witnesses who must travel to the forum."5 In addition
to looking at the location of witnesses, most, if not all, courts inquire
about access to evidence in both fora.' They assess the relative ease
of access to sources of proof,' which frequently inquires whether the
jury must view evidence. 1 At this point, most courts balance the
overall conveniences of the parties and witnesses (and access to evidence), and then concentrate on the interests of justice.
3. Interests of Justice
Although some question whether the "interests of justice" constitutes a distinct factor or merely modifies "convenience of parties
and witnesses," the legislative history and caselaw confirm that it
constitutes a separate factor. 2 In determining "the interests of

Spring Co., 538 F. Supp. 1187, 1191 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (same); Affymetrix, Inc. v. Synteni, Inc., 28
F. Supp. 2d 192, 203 (D. Del. 1998) (explaining that courts traditionally weigh heavily the
location of material witnesses); Jahncke Serv., Inc. v. OKC Corp., 301 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D. Del.
1969) (same); see also Kelner, supra note 19, at 623 nn.54-58 (collecting cases where location of
witnesses was key to the determination of the § 1404(a) transfer motion).
228. See Midwest Motor Supply Co. v. Kimball, 761 F. Supp. 1316, 1318 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
229. See, e.g., Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879 (noting the importance of "location of books and
records"); Jewelmasters, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 840 F. Supp. 893, 896 (S.D. Fla. 1993)
(finding that the location of relevant documents was a significant factor favoring transfer); Polin
v. Conduction Corp., 340 F. Supp. 602, 606 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (same); Radio Santa Fe, Inc. v. Sena,
687 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D. Tex. 1988); Curtin v. Litton Sys., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 489, 490 (E.D.
Pa. 1973). But see O'Brien v. Goldstar Tech., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 383, 386 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding
that "[d]ocumentary evidence can readily be transported to Western New York, if necessary" and
denying transfer motion); Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 154, 165 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (concluding that location of documents did not favor motion to transfer "given the ready
availability of photocopying and the relative ease with which documents may be selectively
shipped around the country").
230. See Midwest Motor Supply Co., 761 F. Supp. at 1318; Datasouth Computer Corp. v.
Three Dimensional Techs., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 446, 452 (W.D.N.C. 1989); Johnson v. Mississippi,
78 F.R.D. 37, 41 (N.D. Miss. 1977).
231. See Datasouth Computer, 719 F. Supp. at 452 (considering the jury's access to an
evidentiary site); Jurgelis v. Southern Motors Express, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 345, 346 (E.D. Pa.
1959) (same). But see Hess Oil V. I. Corp. v. UOP, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 381, 384 (N.D. Okla. 1978)
(limiting consideration of jury access to a site to unusual circumstances).
232. Both case law and legislative history confirm the factor's independence. See 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a), reviser's notes (1994) ("The new subsection requires the court to determine that the
transfer is necessary for convenience of the parties and witnesses, and further, that it is in the
interest of justice to do so."); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) ('[Section 1404(a)]
empowers a district court to transfer.., if the transfer is warranted by the convenience of
parties and witnesses and promotes the interest of justice."); see, e.g., Terra Int'l, Inc., 922 F.
Supp. at 1362; Kelner, supranote 19, at 627. Despite the consensus that it is a separate factor,
no such agreement exists as to the appropriate criteria for evaluating the interests of justice. See
Letter-Rite, Inc. v. Computer Talk, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 717, 721 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (describing
"interests of justice" as "a grab-bag of sorts that has come largely to encompass the factors
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justice," courts consider as many as twenty different factors. For
example, many courts review where the cause of action arose"3 and
the location of the events involved in the dispute."4 Others look to the
locus of operative facts. 5 To similar effect, some courts examine the
"order in which jurisdiction was obtained" by the district court or the
"nature of the suit.'' "7
Courts consider "location" under an "interest of justice" analysis in other ways, such as by factoring in the enforceability of the
judgments or the existence of related litigation. 39 Many courts weigh
the comparative docket congestion of the two fora.u" Some look to the
efficient functioning of the courts.'
Others balance prejudice to the
plaintiff against the conservation of judicial resources and the possibility of inconsistent judgments. 2
Courts also consider the burden on the local court system and
the adverse effects to local economies as well as the fear of becoming a

enumerated in Gulf Oil"); see also Terra Int'l, Inc. v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 922 F. Supp. 1334,
1363-64 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
233. See, e.g., Grossman v. Schwarz, 678 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Jumara,55 F.3d
at 879.
234. See Midwest Motor Supply Co. v. Kimball, 761 F. Supp. 1316, 1318 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
235. See, e.g., Wine Mkts Int'l, Inc. v. Bass, 939 F. Supp. 178, 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (describing
the locus of operative facts as an obvious factor to consider); Fischer v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car
Co., No. CV-95-4876, 1996 WL 251426, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1996); Mobile Video Servs., Ltd.
v. National Ass'n of Broad. Employees & Technicians, 574 F. Supp. 668, 670-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
236. Ashmore v. Northeast Petroleum Div. of Cargill, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 36, 38 (D. Me. 1996)
(citing Cianbro Corp. v. Curran-Lavoie, Inc., 814 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1987)).
237. Midwest Motor Supply, 761 F. Supp. at 1318.
238. See, e.g., Jumara,55 F.3d at 879.
239. See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 531 (1990) ("[T]o permit a situation in
which two cases involving precisely the same issues are simultaneously pending in different
District Courts leads to the wastefulness of time, energy and money that § 1404(a) was designed
to prevent) (quoting Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960)); Lee v.
Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 445 F. Supp. 189, 192 (D. Del. 1978) ('The interest of justice is served by
the elimination of an unnecessary additional trial.'); American Cynamid Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
903 F. Supp. 781, 787 (D.N.J. 1995); Continental Grain Corp., 364 U.S. at 26; see also Kelner,
supranote 19, at 626 & nn.67-70 (collecting cases).
240. See, e.g., Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879; Midwest Motor Supply Co., 761 F. Supp. at 1318;
Motown Record Corp. v. Mary Jane Girls, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 174, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); LetterRite, Inc. v. Computer Talk, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 717, 722 (N.D. IMI.1985); Neff Athletic Lettering
Co. v. Walters, 524 F. Supp. 268, 274 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Berkshire Int'l Corp. v. Alba-Waldensian,
Inc., 352 F. Supp. 831, 834-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (transferring the case in part because it would be
heard seventeen months sooner in the transferee court). Some courts examine the average time
required for disposition of cases in the two fora. See Kelner, supra note 19, at 625 & nn.63-64
(collecting cases). But see O'Brien v. Goldstar Tech., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 383, 387 (W.D.N.Y. 1993)
(discounting the comparison of docket congestion as a substantial factor).
241. See Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 221 (7th Cir. 1986); Heinz v. Frank
Lloyd Wright Found., 773 F. Supp. 1219, 1225 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
242. See Jumara,55 F.3d at 879; Amoco Prod. Co. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 469 F.
Supp. 236, 244 (D. Del. 1979).
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3
dumping ground for the nation's (and the world's) tort litigation."
Other tribunals review the relative advantages and obstacles to a fair
trial in the prospective transferee fora. 4 Many courts look to the
transferee judge's familiarity with the applicable law.4 5 Still others
heed questions arising in the area of conflict of laws."
Following the lead of Gulf Oil, most courts weigh the local interest in deciding local controversies at home. 7 They also look to the
public policies of the respective fora48 as well as the public interests
involved. 9 Finally, courts account for "any special circumstances
present in the case '" as well as "all other considerations of a practical
nature that make a trial easy, expeditious and economical.""1
District courts may choose from literally dozens of factors when
ruling on transfer motions. While fleshing out these factors helps to
understand the statute, listing alone does not provide an accurate
picture of § 1404(a)'s role in jurisdictional jurisprudence. Only by
moving beyond the rhetoric to discover how and why courts transfer
cases may one appreciate the ability of § 1404(a) to ensure the imposition of the most appropriate regulatory regime.

VII. DETOURING AROUND BURNHAMS ROADBLOCK: USING § 1404 TO
INSERT FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS INTO FORUM SELECTION
A. Moving Beyond the Rhetoric
In looking beyond the rhetoric of convenience and concentrating on the many factors district courts use to determine the appropriateness of § 1404(a) motions, the caselaw reveals that trial judges are
actually concerned with the imposition of a regulatory regime and

243. See Albright, supranote 22, at 363 (explaining that courts fear overburdening particular
local courts and adversely affecting local economies).
244. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1516 (10th Cir.
1991).
245. See Jumara,55 F.3d at 879; Midwest Motor Supply Co., 761 F. Supp. at 1318; Lafayette
1986) (transferring to the District Court
Coal Co. v. Gilman Paper Co., 640 F. Supp. 1, 2 (N.D. Ill.
for the Southern District of Georgia because Georgia law applied); Lozano v. Civiletti, 89 F.R.D.
475, 480 (D.D.C. 1980). But see Houk v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 613 F. Supp. 923, 932 (W.D. Mo.
1985) (denying transfer motion based on application of applicable Georgia law because the law
was neither complex nor unsettled).
246. See Chrysler Credit Corp., 928 F.2d at 1516.
247. See, e.g., Jumara,55 F.3d at 879; infra note 279, and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Jumara,55 F.3d at 879.
249. See FTC v. MacArthur, 532 F.2d 1135, 1143 (7th Cir. 1976).
250. Id.
251. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Ritter, 371 F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir. 1967).
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notions of fundamental fairness." Although some courts continue to
describe § 1404(a) as merely a federal judicial housekeeping measure,= a closer analysis reveals that § 1404(a) stands for much more
than a "convenience" doctrine. The notion that § 1404(a) relates
merely to convenience springs from its roots in the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. Though many associate "conveniens"
with the word "convenient," conveniens actually derives from the
In fact,
Latin verb "convenio," meaning appropriate or suitable.'
when the Supreme Court ushered the forum non conveniens doctrine
into modern American jurisprudence in Gulf Oil, it chose the most
appropriate forum rather than the most physically convenient one.'
In the very opinion the Supreme Court chose to describe
§ 1404(a) as a housekeeping measure, it also explained that "[s]ection
1404(a) directs a district court to take account of factors other than
those that bear solely on the parties' private ordering of their
The Reviser's Notes to § 1404(a) further reveal the purpose
affairs."'
behind the statute, as the Notes refer litigants to Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. Co. v. Kepner. 7 In Kepner, the plaintiff brought a claim in New
York under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, even though the
accident occurred and the employee resided in Ohio. The Notes explain that § 1404(a) requires courts to determine whether a transfer is
necessary "for convenience of the parties and witnesses, and further,
that it is in the interest of justice to do so.''"B The Notes' choice of
examples provides insight into the purpose of § 1404(a). It illustrates
that the term "convenience" means more than physical location. The

252. See Cox, supra note 121, at 744 n.54 ("Ire-emphasize my own 'take' on fairness
considerations has little to do with the physical convenience or inconvenience to a defendant of
being sued in a particular forum and has much more to do with the likelihood that the defendant
will be disadvantaged on the merits by suit in that forum.").
253. See Stewart Org., v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988).
254. See CASSELL'S LATIN DICTIONARY 150 (D.P. Simpson ed., 5th ed. 1968); see also Albright,
supra note 22, at 357 n.30 (explaining the distinction); id. at 360 n.48 (noting that
"inappropriateness" is "the real issue in the forum non conveniens motion'); id. at 361 n.52
("Even proponents of forum non conveniens dismissals admit that private convenience is often of
little importance in today's world of electronic communication and jet travel.").
255. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947) (developing private and public
interest factors to determine appropriateness); see also Young Lee, Note, Forum Selection
Clauses:Problems of Enforcement in Diversity Cases and State Courts, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 663, 689 (1997) (explaining that Gulf Oil Corp. focuses on finding a forum closely connected to

the dispute).
256. Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 30.
257. For an explanation of the Revisor's Notes and its treatment of Kepner, see Norwood v.
Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 34 (1955) (Clark, J., dissenting).
258. See Norwood, 349 U.S. at 34 (Clark, J., dissenting) (quoting Reviser's Notes) (citations
omitted).
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term portends a search for the appropriate regulatory regime as
determined by where the cause of action arose.
Some courts explicitly acknowledge that convenience is really
not the issue. One court explained that when courts use the phrase
"convenience of parties and witnesses," it really describes something
else.' Other courts have used the fourth factor, "where it might have
been brought," to perform a fundamental fairness jurisdictional analysis.' In Koster v. American Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.," the
Supreme Court observed that the books, records, and witnesses were
all located in Illinois. In rejecting the plaintiffs choice of a forum
other than Illinois, the Court explained that, in derivative actions, "it
is more likely that only the corporation's books, records and transactions will be important and only the defendant will be affected by
In essence, the
the choice of the place of production of records."'
Court used the physical location of witnesses and evidence to describe
where the cause of action arose and, not coincidentally, the proper
The Supreme Court discovered
regulatory regime to be imposed.'
what many district courts already knew: the most physically convenient forum is often also the forum where the cause of action arose.
This close association based on the existence of readily identifiable facts has led many to confuse convenience for where the cause of
action arose.' Consider the analysis of one district court:
If the "claim arose elsewhere," then it seems most likely the parties, the witnesses, the
documents, and all of the other evidence will also be located "elsewhere." As a result, a
defendant should have some strong arguments supporting its motion to transfer. In
this light, all other things being equal, the "balance of convenience" should tip in favor
26 5
of the forum which is located "elsewhere."

259. See Construction Aggregates Corp. v. S.S. Azalea City, 399 F. Supp. 662, 664 (D.N.J.
1975) (finding a forum in Puerto Rico more appropriate because the conduct that gave rise to the
action occurred there).
260. See Wine Mkts. Int'l, Inc. v. Bass, 939 F. Supp. 178, 179-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Midwest
Motor Supply Co. v. Kimball, 761 F. Supp. 1316, 1317-18 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
261. Koster v. American Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 531 (1947) ("Petitioner
shows not a single witness or source of evidence available to him in New York and does not deny
that his complaint will require exhaustive examination of the transactions of these Illinois
corporations, all of which occurred in Illinois and are to be tested by its laws.').
262. Id. at 526.
263. See id. at 527 (explaining that "the ultimate inquiry is where trial will best serve the
convenience of the parties and the ends of justice).
264. Properly understood, convenience is nothing more than verbal shorthand used to
describe where the cause of action arose. See Norwood, supra note 16, at 325 (arguing for a
system that focuses on convenience but providing examples of this focus that identified the forum
where the cause of action arose as the convenient forum).
265. Affymetrix, Inc. v. Synteni, Inc, 28 F. Supp. 2d 192, 201 (D. Del. 1998).
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The Supreme Court in Van Dusen v. Barrackexplained the correlation
between convenience and appropriateness: "the most convenient
forum is frequently the place where the cause of action arose and
[thus] the conflict-of-laws rules of other States may often refer to the
substantive rules of the more convenient forum. ' 2
B. The Proofis in the Practice
Examining district court transfer decisions reveals that many
turn on not physical convenience but rather the imposition of the most
appropriate regulatory regime.26
In Linzer v. EMI Blackwood Music, Inc., the District Court for
the Southern District of New York found that despite the physical
inconvenience of a New York forum to the defendant, the totality of
the circumstances did not warrant transfer.'
The court observed a
connection between the plaintiffs' contract and copyright-renewal
claims and the New York forum.' It found that New York, therefore,
provided the most efficient access to the relevant documents and witnesses."' According to the court, these factors strongly militated in
favor of litigating the case in New York. 1 Such reasoning indicates
that the court was really determining where the cause of action arose
and seeking the imposition of the most appropriate regulatory regime.
The court's explanation, that the proper choice of venue was New York
because New York law may govern many of the claims, offers further
evidence of a fundamental fairness rationale. It held that trying the
case in the forum at home with the governing law best served the
interests of justice.'
Similar reasoning can be found in Brockman v. Sun Valley
Resorts, Inc." The defendant argued that the cause of action arose
outside the forum but couched his motion in convenience terms. 4 The
court then performed, in effect, an appropriateness analysis. 5 It

266. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 628 (1964) (footnote omitted).
267. See, e.g., American Cynamid Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 903 F. Supp. 781, 787-88 (D.N.J.
1995) (granting transfer motion based on the interests of justice without explaining its logic);
Jacobson v. Gereau, No. 87-C-7429, 1987 WL 28276, at *1 (N.D. MI.. Dec. 11, 1987) (using a
transfer motion to perform a fundamental fairness analysis of jurisdiction).
268. Linzer v. EMI Blackwood Music, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 207, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
269. See id.
270. See id. at 216-17.
271. See id.
272. See id. at 217.
273. Brockman v. Sun Valley Resorts, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1176, 1182-83 (D. Minn. 1996).
274. See id. at 1180-81.
275 See id. at 1182-83.
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explained that the burden of jury duty should not be imposed on the
people of a community that has no relation to the litigation. 78 The
court looked to the relative interests in regulating the underlying
dispute. The cause of action involved indoor arena air quality and
ventilation.2" The arena was located in Idaho, but the plaintiffs
78
The court found that a federal court
brought suit in Minnesota.!
sitting in Idaho could better determine the standard of care in Idaho,
given the novel issues presented for Idaho law. 9 The court validated
the defendant's concern that if the case went to trial in Minnesota,
"the standard of reasonable arena safety applied to them will be
higher than the standard an Idaho court and jury would apply, particularly since Minnesota's experience imposing air quality standards
The court concluded
is more exhaustive than Idaho's experience."'
that physical convenience alone did not justify transfer; however, the
novelty of the controlling legal issue tipped the scales in favor of
transfer."1
These examples illustrate that at least some district courts
recognize the importance of forum and realize that the judicial branch
represents part of a sovereign's overall regulatory regime. Although
courts are rarely so explicit in their reasoning, the following "convenience" reasons frequently offered by courts in justifying transfers are
really masquerades for regulatory interests.
1. Familiarity with the Applicable Law
In determining the "interests of justice," trial courts often look
to the applicable law. In other words, they determine which regulatory regime should attach its legal consequences to the particular set
of facts in the case. When courts find that the law of another state
governs the suit, they transfer the case almost without exception, so
that the appropriate sovereign's judicial procedures and other influences govern the suit.' For example, in Letter-Rite Inc. v. Computer

276. See id.at 1182.
277. See id.
278. See id. at 1177-78.
279. See id. at 1183.
280. Id.
281. See id.
1994) ("[O]ne of the
282. See, e.g., Dunn v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 864 F. Supp. 64, 67 (N.D. Ill.
most important issues to be considered is the familiarity of the trial court with the law to be
applied in the case.'); Kepler v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 860 F. Supp. 393, 399 (E.D. Mich. 1994)
(transferring the case to Florida because, inter alia, Florida law governed); Gundle Lining Const.
Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 844 F. Supp. 1163, 1166 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (concluding that the
applicability of the transferee's law "weighs heavily in favor of transferring venue"); Steinberg,
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Talk, Inc., the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found
that the cause of action arose in Colorado and Colorado law applied.'
It explained, "[u]nder such circumstances, Gulf Oil teaches [that] it
makes sense to hold the trial 'in a forum that is at home with the state
law that must govern the case."' District courts are especially sensitive to the regulatory policy of other states. They will routinely transfer cases that present complex and novel issues for the transferee's
forum.'
Courts make such decisions not for convenience's sake but
through recognition of and respect for the transferee's power to impose
its regulatory regime on causes of action that arise within its forum
and the high likelihood that a federal court in that forum will be intimately familiar with the particular regulatory regime.
2. Method of Asserting Jurisdiction
The strongest evidence in support of the argument that courts
use § 1404(a) not for convenience but as a mechanism to perform an
appropriateness analysis comes from cases transferred between courthouses in close physical proximity." The Third Circuit, in Jumara v.
State Farm Insurance Co., upheld the transfer of a case from the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 87 Unable to explain its decision on convenience grounds, the
court justified the transfer as achieving the imposition of the proper

supra note 31, at 1489 n.35 ("Most transfer opinions agree that where the law of another state
governs a suit, this fact supports a transfer."); see also Steinberg, supra note 31, at 1504 n.97
('Most decisions have concluded that the applicability of a foreign state's law favors a transfer,
because federal judges sitting in the foreign state will be most familiar with the relevant law,
and thus better able to apply it."). But see Ayers v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 571 F. Supp. 707, 710
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (observing that "applying the law of another jurisdiction within the United
States poses no particular problem to any federal forum" and thus should not factor into the
defendant's motion to transfer).
283. Letter-Rite, Inc. v. Computer Talk, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 717, 722 (N.D. IlM. 1985).
284. Id. (citation omitted).
285. See, e.g., Clisham Management, Inc. v. American Steel Bldg. Co., 792 F. Supp. 150, 158
(D. Conn. 1992) (transferring the case to Texas, where "the complexity and novel nature of Texas
law in this dispute is particularly significant"); Environmental Serv., Inc. v. Bell Lumber & Pole
Co., 607 F. Supp. 851, 855 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (concluding the same "because issues of local law are
best construed by courts most familiar with them").
286. Some courts fail to recognize the importance of transfers between neighboring
jurisdictions. In Ashmore v. Northeast PetroleumDivision of Cargill,Inc., 925 F. Supp. 36, 39-40
(D. Me. 1996), the court observed that, because the District Court in Maine was only two hours
away from the District of Massachusetts, the facts did not warrant transfer, even though
Massachusetts law applied to the cause of action. The court stated that "[c]hoice of law is a
separate consideration that should not be confused with a venue analysis." Id. at 39.
287. Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 883 (3d Cir. 1995).
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regulatory regime.' The court determined that the Middle District of
Pennsylvania had specific jurisdiction over the cause of action while
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had only general jurisdiction.'
Thus, the Middle District was the most appropriate forum to adjudicate the underlying dispute. After considering all relevant factors,'
the Third Circuit upheld the district court's transfer of the suit from
the Eastern to the Middle District even though the difference in physical convenience was negligible. The real reason for the transfer was
the regulatory interest of the Middle District.'
The transferring court
explicitly performed a special jurisdiction analysis based on where the
cause of action arose.2 The court's holding thus illustrates that the
use of the word "convenience" stands for much more than physical
convenience. In fact, it often has nothing to do with convenience.
3. Local Interests Decided at Home
Many courts describe the notion of having local interests decided at home as convenience to the court."3 "Convenience," in this
context, however, serves as legal shorthand for appropriateness and
fundamental fairness. At least one court acknowledged that the notion of deciding local questions at home "involves a balancing of the
original forum's interest in the litigation against that of the alternative forum."" ' In Willoughby v. Potomac Electric Power Co., the court
made this point explicit. Its balancing focused on where the case
arose. The court found that the defendant maintained its principal
offices in the District of Columbia, the plaintiff was employed and
terminated there, and every management employee involved in the
decision to terminate the plaintiff worked in the District. The court
observed that, when the defendant resides in another forum, the

288. See id. at 879. The court first noted that the burden of establishing the need for
transfer rests with the movant, in this case the defendant, and that the plaintiffs choice of forum
"should not be lightly disturbed." Id. at 879. (citing Schexnider v. McDermott Int'l, Inc., 817 F.2d
1159 (5th Cir. 1987); Miracle Stretch Underwear Corp. v. Alba Hosiery Mills, Inc., 136 F. Supp.
508 (D. Del. 1955)).
289. See id.at 878-79.
290. See id. at 879.
291. See id. at 880.
292. See id. at 882.
293. See Litman, supranote 146, at 569.
294. Jennings v. Boeing Co., 660 F. Supp. 796, 807 (E.D. Pa. 1987). Although the court

engaged in forum non conveniens analysis, it used the same factors as those employed in
§ 1404(a) analysis. The court undertook an interest analysis to determine which regulatory
regime was most appropriate for the underlying cause of action. See id. at 804-07. The court also
looked to the regulatory interests of the two fora, determining which forum had a larger interest

in regulating the underlying dispute. See i. at 807-08.
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claims giving rise to litigation arose in that other forum, and most, if
not all, of the witnesses reside or work in the other forum, courts
routinely order transfer."s The court held that, because the cause of
action arose in the District of Columbia, that forum had a stronger
regulatory interest in adjudicating the dispute and transferred the
case.s
Other courts have also based decisions to transfer on the notion
that local interests should be decided at home. The court in Terra
International,Inc. v. Mississippi Chemical Corp. remarked that it
would not transfer merely to shift inconveniences." It ordered trans- fer because the cause of action arose in Mississippi, "where the local
effects of the [dispute] would be a part of the general experience of any
members of the jury panel.'' "s
As these decisions illustrate, the notion of having local disputes
decided at home does not relate to physical convenience. It shows that
courts are concerned with the imposition of the proper regulatory
regime.299
4. Plaintiffs Choice of Forum
The most revealing factor that convenience is not the real issue
is the varying weight afforded to the plaintiffs choice of forum. Courts
give great deference to the plaintiffs choice of forum if the forum is in
the district in which the cause of action arose." However, the plaintiffs choice of forum garners little deference if the cause of action did
not arise there or the plaintiff does not reside there." Consider the
words of one district court: "'[H]ome turf rule' is merely a short-hand
way of saying that, under the balancing test inherent in any transfer

295. Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 853 F. Supp. 174, 176 (D. Md. 1994); see also
Wellons v. Numerica Say. Bank, 749 F. Supp. 336 (D. Mass. 1990); Stanley v. Numero Uno
Franchise Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1237 (M.D. La. 1990); Edwards v. Texaco, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 101
(E.D. Pa. 1988); Record Date Int'l, Inc. v. Record Date, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1988).
296. See Willoughby, 853 F. Supp. at 176.
297. Terra Int'l, Inc. v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 922 F. Supp. 1334, 1358 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
298. Id. at 1343 n.7.
299. See Overseas Nal Airways, Inc. v. Cargolux Airlines Int'l, S.A., 712 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir.
1983) (explaining that while United States courts have the power to apply the contract laws of
foreign countries, an action should be dismissed when it must "'untangle problems in conflict of
laws, and in law foreign to itself" (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947))).
300. See In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir. 1989); Patel v. Howard Johnson
Franchise Sys., Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1099, 1101 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
301. See Willemijn Houdstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Computer, Inc. 707 F. Supp. 1429,
1436 (D. Del. 1989); Derry Fin. N.V. v. Christiana Cos., 555 F. Supp. 1043, 1045 (D. Del. 1983).
Courts almost always inquire into the residences of the parties. See, e.g., Midwest Motor Supply
Co. v. Kimball, 761 F. Supp. 1316, 1318 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
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analysis, the weaker the connection between the forum and either the
plaintiff or the lawsuit, the greater ability of a defendant to show
sufficient inconvenience to warrant transfer."'' As a general rule, the
plaintiffs choice carries little or no weight when the cause of action
arose in a different forum.'
This practice begins to illustrate how § 1404(a) provides an alternative to the jurisdictional regulatory interest test foreclosed by
Burnham. For example, in Kotlicky v. Sea Ranch, the plaintiff filed
suit in the Northern District of Illinois.' The court rejected the plaintiffs choice and transferred the suit because the cause of action arose
in Florida and Florida had a stronger interest in regulating the
underlying dispute.' The court explained that the plaintiffs choice of
forum receives less deference when "the forum he [or she] chooses
lacks any significant contact to the issues or the property or the transactions which are basic to and underlie [sic] the cause of action that
has been pleaded."'' In essence, the court weighed regulatory interests as well as interests of basic and fundamental fairness.'
Others courts have taken a similar approach. When a plaintiffs choice of forum asserts only general jurisdiction, courts do not
give much weight to the plaintiffs choice. 8 Such rulings demonstrate
that courts are really concerned with determining where the cause of
action arose and the proper regulatory regime to impose.' The decisions also illustrate the nature of the legal shorthand of "plaintiffs
choice of forum." When courts declare that they usually defer to the
plaintiffs choice, it is because that choice usually bears a relationship
to where the cause of action arose. When the underlying dispute does
not arise in the chosen forum, courts explain that the plaintiffs choice
is entitled to little or no weight at all. In effect, courts are couching
their decisions in convenience terms but really deciding them on

302. Affymetrix, Inc. v. Synteni, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 192, 199 (D. Del. 1998).
303. See Patel, 928 F. Supp. at 1101; Midwest Motor Supply, 761 F. Supp. at 1320 n.7; Neff
Athletic Lettering Co. v. Walters, 524 F. Supp. 268, 272-73 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
304. Kotlicky v. Sea Ranch, No. 86-C-8166, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10159, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
27, 1987).
305. See id. at *2-4.
306. Id. at *4.
307. See id.
308. See Associated Mills, Inc. v. Rush-Hampton Indus., Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1164, 1165 (N.D.
IMI.1984).
309. See Wine Mkts. Int'l, Inc. v. Bass, 939 F. Supp. 178, 183 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[W]here the
transactions or facts giving rise to the action have no material relation or significant connection
to the plaintiffs chosen forum, then the plaintiffs choice is not accorded the same 'great weight'
and in fact is given reduced significance.").
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regulatory appropriateness grounds.3,o Thus, this system is not so
much an analytical framework as a rule that appropriate forum
choices receive great deference and inappropriate forum choices
receive almost none.
5. Location of Witnesses
The 'location of witnesses" is yet another example of legal
shorthand used to signify where the cause of action arose, i.e. the
proper regulatory regime. The vast majority of courts explain that the
location of witnesses is a primary, if not the most important, factor in
determining whether to transfer a case. " ' Asking why further supports the thesis that appropriateness, not convenience, is the real
issue. Courts gravitate toward the convenience of witnesses because
although couched in physical convenience terms, this factor helps
courts determine where a cause of action arose. The location of witnesses and evidence will usually be the location where the cause of
action arose." For example, in Midwest Motor Supply Co. v. Kimball,
the court found that most, if not all, material witnesses were located
in the transferee forum.313 The court further observed, presumably not
by coincidence, that the cause of action arose from the defendant's
conduct that occurred in the transferee forum. "
The court then
deduced that the pertinent witnesses to the underlying dispute would
likely be found in that jurisdiction."5 Thus, while couching its decision
in terms of the physical convenience of witnesses, the court really
decided where the cause of action arose, and transferred it there.
In a similar vein, some courts look directly to the location of the
underlying dispute in evaluating convenience. Although they explain
that they consider this factor in the name of convenience, courts are

310. Prather v. Raymond Constr. Co., 570 F. Supp. 278, 284 (N.D. Ga. 1983) ("Wrhere the
forum selected by the plaintiff is not connected with the parties or the subject matter of the
lawsuit, it is generally less difficult than otherwise for the defendant, seeking a change of venue,
'to meet the burden of showing sufficient inconvenience to tip the balance of convenience strongly
in the defendant's favor.'") (quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Giant Food, Inc., 392 F. Supp.
761, 763 (D. Del. 1975)).
311. See supra note 227, and accompanying text. See also Wine Mkts. Int'l, 939 F. Supp. at
183, which found the location of material witnesses and other evidence a major factor in
determining the most appropriate forum. Evaluating these factors, the court decided against
transfer. See id. at 185.
312. Courts afford this factor so much weight not because they are concerned with the
physical convenience of the witnesses but rather because it is best able to identify where a cause
of action arose and the proper regulatory regime to adjudicate the underlying dispute.
313. Midwest Motor Supply Co. v. Kimball, 761 F. Supp. 1316, 1319 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
314. See id.
315. See id.
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really attempting to determine the most appropriate forum. For
example, in Patel v. Howard Johnson Franchise Systems, Inc., the
defendants argued that the facts underlying the dispute took place in
the Eastern District of Tennessee." 6 The court found that the contract
in question involved property in eastern Tennessee, where the defendants and plaintiffs resided.' After ruling that it would be "too unduly burdensome and expensive in terms of time and expenses" if the
defendant filed a counterclaim in the transferor forum, the court
granted the transfer based on the location of the underlying dispute,
implicitly acknowledging that the transferee forum constituted the
proper regulatory regime."8 Other courts have arrived at similar
results by explaining that the decision to transfer "can be reduced to
'
the relative convenience of the witnesses."319
Although courts couch
their decisions in terms of convenience, they are really ascertaining
where the cause of action arose and the regulatory interests of that
forum in resolving the underlying dispute. In this way, they build an
avenue to the most appropriate forum.
6. Balancing Regulatory Interests
Many courts explicitly evaluate the regulatory interests of the
two fora based on the location of the underlying dispute. They use the
location of the underlying dispute to assist them in determining
whether the convenience of the parties warrants transfer.
In
Affymetrix, Inc. v. Synteni, Inc., the court started its analysis of the
transfer motion by balancing the contacts and regulatory interests of
the two fora in question, Delaware and California. 2 ° The court determined that the overwhelming majority of the witnesses and the relevant documents were located in the Northern District of California. "'
Although it couched its analysis in terms of convenience and physical
location, the court was really concentrating on where the events giving
rise to the lawsuit occurred.3" The court compared the relative regulatory interests of the two fora, finding that the Northern District of
California had a stronger regulatory interest in the dispute." Despite
this almost explicit fundamental fairness analysis, the court stated

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Patel v. Howard Johnson Franchise Sys., Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1099, 1101 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
See id. at 1102.
Id.
O'Brien v. Goldstar Tech., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 383, 386 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
Affymetrix, Inc. v. Synteni, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 192, 196 (D. Del. 1998).
See id. at 194.
See id. at 201-02.
See id. at 207.
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that, in a transfer analysis, it considers convenience, not the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice that inform constitutional jurisdiction determinations." The reasoning and outcome make
clear that
the court is saying one thing but doing something very
32
different.
The Affymetrix court followed Third Circuit precedent, which
required courts to examine "all relevant factors to determine whether
on balance the litigation would more conveniently proceed and the
interests of justice [would] be better served by transfer to a different
forum. 326 These factors include a wide variety of public and private
interests used to determine on a case-by-case basis whether
considerations of convenience and fairness weigh in favor of transfer. 3"
Taking a step back allows one to realize what really happens when
courts order § 1404(a) transfers. They are actually using the same
factors from Gulf Oil 31 that many thought formed part of the movement to extend fundamental fairness into general jurisdiction.3 "
When courts look to these various factors they are really investigating
where the cause of action arose despite couching their decisions in the
rhetoric of convenience. Through § 1404(a), courts can circumvent the
confines of general jurisdiction (and Burnham) and transfer the case
to a more appropriate forum, which by definition has special juris33
diction.

324. See id. at 208.
325. By using recognition of the proper regulatory regime to ascertain physical convenience
of witnesses, courts presume the latter provides legitimate grounds for transfer when, in fact,
seeking the proper regulatory regime offers the best reason to transfer "in the interests of
justice."
326. Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting 15 WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 217, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS §
3847.
327. See id. at 883 (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30-31 (1988));
Affymetrix, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d at 197.
328. See Affymetrix, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 197 n.4; All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d
1010, 1011 (3d Cir. 1952); Paragon-Revolute Corp. v. C. F. Pease Co., 120 F. Supp. 488, 489 (D.
Del. 1954); General Felt Prods. Co. v. Allen Indus., Inc., 120 F. Supp. 491, 493 (D. Del. 1954); see
also Affymetrix, 28 F. Supp. 2d. at 197 (listing eleven factors based on the private and public
interests from Gulf Oil Corp. but noting that these lists are "merely illustrative and by no means
exhaustive').
329. See supranote 110 and accompanying text.
330. The use of § 1404(a) to insert fundamental fairness into a type of jurisdiction that does
not require such analysis is not new. When Seider-style jurisdiction was thought constitutional,
at least one court utilized § 1404(a) to insert fundamental fairness into that jurisdictional device.
In Ladson v. Kibble, 307 F. Supp. 11, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court condoned the use of a transfer
motion for a Seider-style action. In determining the interests of justice and convenience of the
witnesses, the court examined where the cause of action arose and those events giving rise to the
underlying dispute. See id. It found that the state in which the cause of action arose had a
stronger regulatory interest and thus concluded that "[iut is therefore clear to this court [that], in
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Some courts explicitly declare that transfer is warranted not
for the convenience of the parties but rather to ensure the imposition
of the proper regulatory regime."
In American Littoral Society v.
EPA, the court resolved the transfer issue by looking at the regulatory
interests of the two fora."' The court explained that two citizen groups
brought the suit to improve the quality of water in Delaware.333 The
court observed that "this case is focussed [sic] on the interests of the
state of Delaware and its citizens, and having the trial in Delaware
best fosters the interests of persons who, although not parties to the
case, are most directly affected by its outcome."" The court explained
that the public interests of Delaware and its citizens formed the basis
of the court's decision to transfer.335 The court used § 1404(a) to transfer the case to a forum that had a strong regulatory interest in adjudicating the dispute."
The rule that courts may only transfer an entire action, not individualized claims, provides further evidence that fundamental fairness and regulatory interests are the central concerns, and convenience serves merely as legal shorthand developed to accomplish such
results.3 7 Once transferred, the transferor court loses all jurisdiction
over the case, including the power to review the transfer.3 3
The
rationale is simple: when transferring, the transferor forum relinquishes all regulatory authority over the cause of action because the
very act of transfer admits that the transferor court is not the proper
forum to regulate the underlying dispute.339 This also explains why

the interests of justice and for the convenience of the witnesses and parties, this action should be
transferred. ..." Id. at 16-17. This illustrates that before Seider-style jurisdiction was rendered
unconstitutional, § 1404(a) provided a vehicle for considering fundamental fairness. In the wake
of Burnham and the per se constitutional status of general jurisdiction, courts and litigants must
again turn to § 1404(a).
331. See, for example, Torres v. Steamship Rosario, 125 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), which
transferred the case to Puerto Rico, where the cause of action arose and both witnesses and the
plaintiffs resided. But see Hill's Pet Prods. v. A.S.U., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 774, 778 & n.8 (D. Kan.
1992) (performing an ad hoc analysis but stating that "the relative interests of the respective
states is not a relevant factor in the analysis under § 1404(a)').
332. See American Littoral Soc'y v. EPA, 943 F. Supp. 548, 549-50 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
333. See id. at 550.
334. Id.
335. See id. at 551.
336. See id.
337. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1518 (10th Cir.
1991); Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 618 (2d Cir. 1968); Cain v. New York State Bd.
of Elections, 630 F. Supp. 221, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
338. See Chrysler Credit Corp., 928 F.2d at 1516-17; Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs. v. La
Quinta Motor Inns, 689 F.2d 982, 988-89 n.10 (11th Cir. 1982).
339. See In re Flight Trans. Corp. Sec. Litig., 764 F.2d 515, 516 (8th Cir. 1985); In re Nine
Mile Ltd., 673 F.2d 242, 243 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
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courts do not allow the partition of pre-trial processes among several
geographically convenient fora." The inevitable conclusion is that
only the proper regulatory machinery should impose its mass of legal
consequences on the particular cause of action.
By moving beyond the rhetoric, it is possible to understand
that § 1404(a) is much more than a statute concerned with physical
convenience. In the wake of Burnham, it becomes the best tool for
courts to use in protecting defendants from assertions of general jurisdiction by improper regulatory regimes.
C. The Critics Provide Credence
Using § 1404(a) to provide an avenue to the appropriate forum
is not without its critics. Ironically, on the whole, criticism of
§ 1404(a) actually supports the thesis of this Note. For example, most
commentators view the ever-expanding list of factors employed by
district courts as evidence of confusion, disillusionment, dissatisfaction, and the need for reform.' They explain that, as the number
of factors increases, the defendant's ability to annul the plaintiffs
choice of forum expands."' In addition, commentators cringe at the
supposed unpredictability that the courts' ad hoc approach produces. 3
They posit that unpredictability costs money and will lead to more
transfer orders for less than worthy reasons.'

340. See FTC v. MacArthur, 532 F.2d 1135, 1143 (7th Cir. 1976).
341. See, e.g., Kelner, supra note 19, at 615 ('The lack of consistency among the district
courts as to which factors they should apply and how to weigh each factor compounds the
problem of increased ligitation.'); id. at 615-16 (describing the "several problems" caused by
"[this unchecked district court discretion... [b]ecause § 1404(a) embraces so many different
factors" and "because district courts weight the many applicable factors inconsistently'). Kelner
explained that, while the present system "enhance[s] the likelihood of a fair result in a particular
case," the need for black letter rules outweighs this fairness. Id. at 617. Thus the author suggests
a steadfast rule that restricts the use of § 1404(a) to motions involving "extreme inconvenience."
Id.
342. See, e.g., id. at 615.
343. See Steinberg, supranote 184, at 447; Kelner, supranote 19, at 632 (explaining that the
many factors "make the outcome of transfer motions rather unpredictable'). But see Kitch, supra
note 216, at 99 (noting that § 1404(a) "has received nearly unanimous praise from the
commentators and the courts in light of its unexceptionable objectives of convenience and
justice'). Professor Kitch, however, concluded "that the cure is itself a serious disease." Id. at
101. Kitch reasoned that the costs of handling numerous, difficult transfer motions are too high.
See id. at 131. Accord David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pt.
2), 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 307 (1969) (explaining that it "costs altogether too much time and
money" to handle transfer motions); Steinberg, supra note 184, at 523 (concluding that transfer
motions are in practice "a cumbersome and costly procedure with few real beneficiaries).
344. See Steinberg, supra note 184, at 447; Kelner, supra note 19, at 632. Professors
Clermont and Eisenberg, however, note that
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These scholars fail to realize that § 1404(a) accomplishes what
the Supreme Court's decision in Burnham attempted to stifle: the use
of ad hoc value judgments under the criteria of fundamental fairness
to select the appropriate forum for a cause of action. Consider the
words of the Supreme Court in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh

Corp.:
Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer [on a consideration of fairness and convenience.] .. . Congress has
directed that multiple considerations govern transfer within the federal court system,
and... focusing on a single concern or a subset of the factors identified in § 1404(a)
would defeat that command. Its application would impoverish the flexible and multifaceted analysis that Congress intended to govern mntions to transfer within the federal system. 345

When commentators criticize the ad hoc nature of § 1404(a)
determinations, they are, in effect, criticizing the very foundation of
special jurisdiction and fundamental fairness analysis.
Despite
American courts' familiarity with flexible tests in jurisdictional jurisprudence,"" criticism of the fact-intensive § 1404(a) inquiry should not
come as a surprise. Critics who thought that "[c]ourts cannot agree on
how specific facts should influence [a] result,"34' abounded prior to
Burnham and ultimately carried the day in that decision. Just as the
Burnham Court opined that litigants need black letter rules so they
can understand the law, many critics of § 1404(a) demand black letter
rules. 8 In fact, some maintain that the lack of black letter rules
349
encourages extensive forum-shopping by defendants.

[o]ddly, while faulting the costs of transfer, Professor Steinberg principally attacked the
courts' transfer opinions for considering many varied factors that seemed to get different
weights in different situations, although one would expect and even desire such
decisionmaking under a discretionary, individualized, all-things-considered standard
such as 1404(a)'s transfer 'in the interest of justice.'
Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 1511 n.13. For Professor Steinberg's response to this
and other contentions advanced by Professors Clermont and Eisenberg, see Steinberg, supranote
31, at 1479. For example, Professor Steinberg notes that, "[w]hen combined with the open-ended
standard employed in transfer litigation, this sort of fact-specific analysis is certain to encourage
litigation about the proper location for a suit." Id. at 1512. This Note argues that, after
Burnham, litigating the proper location of a suit over which a forum has only general jurisdiction
serves the interests of justice by seeking the full weight of the proper regulatory regime. Such
concerns do not seem to faze Professor Steinberg.
345. Stewart Org., v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29-31 (1988).
346. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 30 (1971) ("A state has power
to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who is a resident bf the state unless the
individual's relationship to the state is so attenuated as to make the exercise of such jurisdiction
unreasonable.'); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
347. Weintraub, supra note 49, at 545. This has led some to advocate a system permitting
transfer to a more appropriate forum upon a defendant's showing of unfairness. See id.
348. See, e.g., Steinberg, supranote 184, at 510-12 (concluding that the current body of law is
in chaos and proposing black letter rules); Kelner, supra note 19, at 642-43. But black letter
rules can sometimes be more inconsistent and manipulative. For example, in a span of five years,
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These critics fail to realize that, in the wake of Burnham, §
1404(a) is essential to impute any semblance of fundamental fairness
into the determination of the appropriate forum. It prevents a forum
from asserting general jurisdiction in order to inappropriately impose
its regulatory regime.3" The critics fail to realize that § 1404(a) is
accomplishing exactly this task by allowing ad hoc value judgments.35 '
The similarity between critics of § 1404(a) and critics of special jurisdiction tends to illustrate the similarity of the two doctrines.35
Taking a closer look at § 1404(a) illustrates the true nature of
the statute."u Section 1404(a) provides an alternative route to the
special jurisdiction avenue closed by the Supreme Court's decision in
Burnham. The explosion of factors utilized by district courts is really
not an explosion but rather an accumulation of identifiable facts that
courts found appropriate under certain circumstances to warrant a
transfer to a more appropriate regulatory regime. Unfortunately,
§ 1404(a) still faces certain obstacles in its attempt to provide an
alternative avenue for protection against assertions of general jurisdiction.

eight Arkansas telegraph cases on basically similar facts were characterized differently as either
in tort or contract. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Flannagan, 167 S.W. 701, 702 (Ark. 1914)
(action characterized as contract); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chilton, 140 S.W. 26, 26 (Ark. 1911)
(action characterized as tort). By characterizing the same actions differently, the courts were
able to trigger different black letter rules. Thus "so-called black letter rules" are easily
manipulated by simply characterizing the underlying dispute as either contract or tort.
349. See Terra Int'l, Inc. v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 922 F. Supp. 1334, 1356 (N.D. Iowa
1996); Steinberg, supranote 31, at 1487.
350. See, e.g., Kelner, supra note 19, at 633 ("The personal jurisdiction question is better
suited for an analysis that concentrates on fairness-where it is fair and reasonable for a
defendant to be sued."). The author continued: "Because fairness concerns of constitutional
proportions have already been addressed at the personal jurisdiction level, the transfer of venue
decision need not duplicate these fairness issues." Id. Obviously, this is not an author familiar
with Burnham.
351. See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 216, at 141 ("Section 1404(a) suffers from an irremedial
defect .... [Most transfers serve no significant purpose and the courts become burdened with
consideration of § 1404(a) motions."). Some commentators, however, foresaw the role § 1404(a)
would play after the Court announced its decision in Burnham. See Silberman, supranote 175,
at 583-90; see also Irwin, supra note 4, at 624 ("[1]t is probable that the doctrine of forum non
conveniens will assume the position once held by International Shoe and Shaffer among the
critics of transient jurisdiction .... Mhe factors utilized by courts with respect to forum non
conveniens balancing are remarkably similar to the factors relevant to 'minimum contacts'
analysis.").
352. See, e.g., Posnak, supra note 4, at 887-98 (criticizing specific jurisdiction). The
similarity in criticism leveled at both § 1404(a) and specific jurisdiction illustrates the similarity
in the two concepts and implicitly acknowledges the ability of § 1404(a) to achieve results similar
to specific jurisdiction.
353. Consider the comments of Professor Steinberg, supra note 184, at 509, who "concluded
that these factors actually demonstrate little about the relative convenience of different
districts."
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VIII. OVERCOMING POTHOLES ALONG THE WAY

Although the federal transfer statute goes a long way in re-inserting fundamental fairness into general jurisdiction, it suffers certain shortfalls that prevent it from delivering the same'results a con-

stitutional jurisdictional analysis would provide. The most obvious
shortcoming: its lack of constitutional foundation. Prior to Burnham,
litigants could assert a constitutional due process claim against a

forum's assertion of general jurisdiction when that forum lacked
special jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in Burger King v. Rudzewicz

explained that "the Due Process Clause 'gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where

that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.'

""

Although

§ 1404(a) attempts to effectuate this very goal, it does not rise to the
level of constitutional protection."n
Placing aside the constitutional shortcomings of § 1404(a), the

statute still faces two other perceived roadblocks in its pursuit of
constructing an alternative avenue for obtaining protection from
unfair general jurisdiction assertions. These obstacles include: (1) the

lack of appellate review of transfer motion decisions; and (2) the possibly intractible perception that § 1404(a) accomplishes merely a change

of courthouses and not a change of regulatory regimes.
A. TransferringWithout Review
Appellate review3" of forum non conveniens and transfer orders
is generally not available until the trial court issues a final judgment
on the merits of the case."' In addition, the majority of circuits have

354. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); see also World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
355. Arguments can be made for its constitutional status. Recall that § 1404(a) operates as a
mechanism to ensure that the proper regulatory regime within the federal system adjudicates
the dispute. One could argue that when one forum improperly asserts its regulatory machinery
to the detriment of another, it violates the constitutional principles of federalism and state
sovereignty. Development of such arguments will await another day.
356. Reviewable decisions are those that will be eventually reviewed by an appellate court
upon ultimate disposition on the merits while appealable decisions may be reviewed immediately
by an appellate court.
357. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) (allowing appeals only upon final judgment); United States
Fire Ins. Co. v. American Family Life Assurance Co., 787 F.2d 438, 439 (8th Cir. 1986); Macon
Uplands Venture v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 624 F.2d 26, 27 (5th Cir. 1980); 15 WRIGHT ET.
AL., supra note 217, § 3855, at 472-94; Kelner, supra note 19, at 614-15 (citing sources that hold
such); Christina Melady Morin, Note, Review and Appeal of Forum Non Conveniens and Venue
Transfer Orders, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 715, 715, 719-21 (1991).
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ruled that neither forum non conveniens orders3" nor transfer orders"
are immediately appealable as of right under the collateral order
doctrine.3 Furthermore, mandamus is used sparingly and only when
a trial court has usurped its judicial power, such as by acting beyond
its jurisdiction."' In fact, transfer orders are unreviewable as of the
date the papers in the transferred case are docketed in the transferee
court.' The circuits have split over whether a transferee circuit has
jurisdiction to review the decisions of a transferor district court.M
Moreover, when § 1404(a) transfer orders finally come up for review,
appellate courts apply the abuse of discretion standard,' and rarely
reverse. 65 In response, many commentators have criticized the motion
as one that runs unchecked," while others have proposed legislation
to allow for immediate review. 7
While these concerns are understandable, they are rooted in
appeals to black letter rules and undervalue the need for discretion in

358. See Carlenstolpe v. Merck & Co., 819 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987); Partrederiet Treasure
Saga v. Joy Mfg. Co., 804 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1986); Rosenstein v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
769 F.2d 352, 354 (6th Cir. 1985); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d
190, 195 (3d Cir. 1983). But see Kontoulas v. A.H. Robins Co., 745 F.2d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 1984).
359. See, e.g., Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360, 362 (4th Cir.
1949).
360. The collateral order doctrine "allow[s] appeal from an interlocutory order that
conclusively determines an issue wholly separate from the merits of the action and is effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgmene' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 256 (7th ed. 1999).
361. See Morin, supra note 357, at 726 n.81 (1991); see also All States Freight, Inc. v.
Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011 (3d Cir. 1952) (expressing concern over review of transfer orders
through mandamus); Note, Appealabilityof 1404(a) Orders:Mandamus Misapplied,67 YALE L.J.
122, 133-34 (1967).
362. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1517 (10th Cir.
1991); In re Sosa, 712 F.2d 1479, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Starnes v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 924
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (enbanc).
363. See Chrysler Credit Corp., 928 F.2d at 1517 (collecting and analyzing sources on the
split).
364. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) ("[A transfer order] may be
reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Where the court has considered all
relevant public and private interest factors and where its balancing of these factors is
reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference.'); Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc. v.
Cargolux Airlines Int'l, S.A., 712 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Morin, supra note 357, at
719-20 (1991) (explaining that § 1404(a) decisions are rarely disturbed upon review).
365. See, e.g., Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of Am., 408 F.2d 16, 20 (9th Cir. 1969) (explaining
that appellate courts afford trial judges great deference; decisions will not be overturned if they
include a "well-reasoned holding" that considers the issues listed in § 1404(a)); Rouchell, supra
note 189, at 432 (noting that appellants have little chance of winning reversal, as the appellate
court must find abuse of discretion).
366. See Steinberg, supra note 184, at 472 (explaining that § 1404(a) transfer orders are
"uniquely insulated from any form of appellate review").
367. See Morin, supra note 357, at 733-34 (1991) (proposing legislation that specifically
addresses clear abuses of discretion by trial courts modeled after a Florida statute, FLA. R. APP.
P. 9.125).

2000]

BYPASSING BURNHAM

375

trial judges to make determinations on a case-by-case basis. While
some fears are not unreasonable, at some level the federal judicial
system must trust district courts to make proper ad hoc value judgments. In fact, the more scrutiny district court decisions receive, the
less they will rely on the particular circumstances of the individual
case and the more they will contain mystical appeals to black letter
rhetoric. Such decisions do not further the interests of justice nor do
they allow the flexibility required to ensure the imposition of the
proper regulatory regime.'
B. TransfersAre "Merely a Change of Courthouses"
The perception that a transfer merely changes location, rather
than regulatory regimes, presents the second obstacle. This perception ignores the intersection of choice of law and choice of jurisdiction.
This section illustrates why this is a problem and how district courts
may overcome it in their application of § 1404(a).
In Van Dusen v. Barrack,the Supreme Court asked what effect
a change in the applicable law would have on "the interest of justice."' 9 The Court observed that lower federal courts were strongly
inclined to protect plaintiffs against prejudicial changes in applicable
state laws."' The Court concluded that a § 1404(a) transfer did not
mandate a change of law to accompany the change in venue. 1' The
Court explained that such a rule would frustrate the remedial purposes of § 1404(a) by dissuading district courts from granting transfers
due to the fear that it would prejudice the plaintiffs claim."2 Van
Dusen thus established the rule that § 1404(a) is a "federal judicial
housekeeping measure" and simply "authorize[s] a change of courtrooms" not a change of law. 3 The Court explained that this rule
supports the policy underlying Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.: it ensures the principle of uniformity of result within a state and makes sure that federal

368. Additionally, fears that judges will refuse to transfer cases may be assuaged by
recognizing that docket backlogs likely create an incentive to transfer cases only when the facts
warrant. But see Lee, supra note 255, at 688 (noting that judicial tendency to renounce one's
jurisdiction is not very strong).
369. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 625-26 (1964).
370. See id. at 630. For the reasons discussed in this Note, such concerns of judicial
possessiveness are not well founded. See supraPart I.
371. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 636.
372. See id.
373. Id. at 636-37.
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courts in diversity of citizenship cases apply the laws of the states in
which they sit.374
The Supreme Court extended this reasoning in Ferens v. John
Deere Co. to include plaintiff-initiated § 1404(a) transfer motions." 5 In
that case, the plaintiff lost his right hand while working on a farm in
Pennsylvania due to an allegedly defective product manufactured by
Deere & Company. 7 After waiting three years, the plaintiff sued
Deere in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania,
raising only contract and warranty claims, as Pennsylvania's two-year
statute of limitations for tort actions had expired. 7 Not to be deprived
of a tort action, the plaintiff filed a second diversity action against
Deere in the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi,
alleging negligence and products liability.7 ' The plaintiff knew that
Klaxon Co. required the Mississippi District Court, in the exercise of
diversity jurisdiction, to apply the same choice-of-law rules that a
Mississippi state court would apply if it decided the case.379 Under
Mississippi's choice of law rules as interpreted by its highest court, the
District Court had to apply Mississippi's six year statute of limitations
to the Pennsylvania law tort claim." Immediately after filing suit, the
plaintiff moved for a § 1404(a) transfer to federal court in Pennsylthe ground that Pennsylvania offered a more convenient
vania 3on
81
forum.
The question before the Supreme Court on appeal was
whether, under Van Dusen, Pennsylvania (the transferee forum) must
apply Mississippi (the transferor forum) law, including its choice-oflaw rules. Van Dusen had left this question open. The Supreme Court
held that Van Dusen applied and obligated Pennsylvania to apply
Mississippi's statute of limitations because Mississippi's choice-of-law
rules required such. The Court opined that the three reasons underlying Van Dusen also pertained to this situation. It explained that: (1)
§ 1404(a) should not deprive parties of state-law advantages that exist
absent diversity jurisdiction; (2) the transfer statute should not create
or multiply opportunities for forum shopping; and (3) the decision on
transfer should turn on considerations of convenience and the interest
of justice rather than on the possible prejudice resulting from a

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

See id. at 637.
Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 532 (1990).
See id. at 519.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 519-20.
See id. at 520.
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change of law.3" The Court again cited Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
in support of its decision."=
Given the facts of the case, the Court's explanation that the
"rule would not create opportunities for forum shopping"3" seems
ironic. The Court regarded § 1404(a) as merely a housekeeping provision and worried that, if district courts spent time making an "elaborate survey of the law" they "would turn what is supposed to be a
statute for convenience of the courts into one expending extensive
judicial time and resources."" Rather than allowing district courts to
perform the proper ad hoc value determination, the Court permitted
plaintiffs to have both their choice of law and their choice of forumeven rewarding the plaintiff for manipulative conduct." In response
to this argument, the Court restated its interests in providing an
acceptable black letter rule."'
The result worked by this black letter rule proved too much for
the Justice who would later write for the Court in Burnham. Criticizing the holding, Justice Scalia stated that it is "unlikely that Congress meant to provide the plaintiff with a vehicle by which to appropriate the law of a distant and inconvenient forum in which he does
not intend to litigate, and to carry that prize back to the State in
which he wishes to try the case."'"M Justice Scalia explained that the
decision would encourage forum shopping between federal and state
courts in the same state on the basis of different substantive law."
Justice Scalia further observed that the plaintiff achieved exactly
what Klaxon was designed to prevent, namely the use of a Pennsylvania federal court instead of a Pennsylvania state court to obtain
application of a different substantive law-Mississippi's.' ° Many
scholars echo Justice Scalia's fear that Ferens threatens to convert §
1404(a) into a plaintiff forum shopping tool that will ultimately
undermine Erie's objective of the uniform application of law within a
state. 9 ' Such a result runs contrary to the Court's rationale in Van

382. See id. at 523.
383. See id.
384. Id. at 527.
385. Id. at 529.
386. See id. at 531.
387. See id.
388. Id. at 535 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
389. See id.
390. See id.
391. See Rodden, supra note 187, at 860. The author also discusses the implications of the
Ferens decision and different variants of a rule that would prevent plaintiff forum shopping. See
id. at 860-67.

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 53:311

Dusen. Although many criticize39 the Ferens decision and even support it being overruled outright,393 § 1404(a) provides the necessary
tools for
district courts to overcome the Supreme Court's decision in
394
Ferens.
1. Overcoming Van Dusen and Ferens
The rules developed in Van Dusen and Ferens restrain the usefulness of § 1404(a) because they attempt to separate forum as a
physical location from forum as a regulatory regime. Fortunately,
district courts have discovered four methods of bypassing these
restraints.
The first exception to the Van Dusen/Ferens rule allows the
transferee forum to apply its law when the transferor forum never
determined whether it had jurisdiction. The Supreme Court actually
provided this exception in Leroy v. Great Western United Corp."
There the Court expressly permitted the consideration of transfers
prior to a finding of personal jurisdiction."
District courts have
latched onto this practice. If a district court intuitively suspects that
it does not represent the proper regulatory regime, it may decline to
make an explicit ruling on personal jurisdiction and simply transfer
the case. Thus, the transferee court must make a jurisdiction determination de novo, thereby allowing it to apply its own law.397 Some
courts have expanded this rationale to "preclude rigid application of

392. See Norwood, supra note 16, at 305 ('Virtually all plaintiff attorneys vigorously
defended the law-shopping in Ferens, while defense attorneys generally deplore it. Virtually
every layperson, however--even law students--could not believe that the Supreme Court allowed
the attorney in Ferens to 'get away with' the law-shopping depicted there.'); Cox, supra note 13,
at 26 n.57 (discussing the illogic of Ferensbecause Mississippi's statute of limitations should not
have transferred to Pennsylvania since Mississippi could not apply its law to the underlying
controversy); see bso David E. Seidelson, 1 (Wortman) + 1 (Ferens) = 6 (years): That Can't Be
Right-Can it? Statutes of Limitations and Supreme Court Inconsistency, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 787,
797-98 (1991); Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law: The Limitations Debate, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV.
683, 692-93.
393. See Norwood, supra note 16, at 320 n.259 (supporting overruling Ferens).
394. Some protections are already "built into" the statute from a practical standpoint. For
example, in plaintiff-initiated transfers, judges are very wary about granting transfers that only
enhance forum shopping. See Rodden, supra note 187, at 868. While this may dissuade some
plaintiffs from filing a suit in a more favorable forum to take advantage of its statute of
limitations and then transferring back to another favorable forum to take advantage of its juries,
etc., it still allows an inappropriate regulatory regime to apply its law to a cause of action. To
overcome this problem, other exceptions to Ferens must be found.
395. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
396. See id. at 180.
397. Cf. Commercial Agency v. Loe, 667 F. Supp. 359, 365 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (using § 1404(a)
to cure lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that the transferee state's law applies).
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law of the case of the [transferor's law]" when the transferee court
finds new evidence or clear error by the transferor court."'8
Other courts have used this exception to re-examine the basis
by which the transferor court allegedly asserted jurisdiction. In
Follette v. Clairol,Inc.,'" the District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana found that it could re-open the jurisdictional question to
determine whether the transferor forum had jurisdiction. The court
found that the plaintiff filed suit in Texas to secure the benefits of
Texas's longer statute of limitations."° It explained that if Texas could
constitutionally exercise in personam jurisdiction over the defendants,
then Ferens required Louisiana to apply Texas's statute of limitations."' The Texas judge had previously concluded that Texas courts
could exert general jurisdiction over the defendants. Nevertheless,
the Louisiana district court deemed it "appropriate... to re-examine
the jurisdictional issue."4 2 The court used a subsequent decision
handed down by the Fifth Circuit to overrule the Texas district court's
determination that the defendants' qualifying to do business in Texas
provided sufficient grounds to confer jurisdiction over the defen0 " The court then deliberated about
dants."
the requirements for general jurisdiction and found such jurisdiction unreasonable and fundamentally unfair under the circumstances presented in the case." The
court examined the relative interests of the two fora, finding Texas's
interest tenuous at best.0 5 After weighing regulatory interests and
finding any assertion of jurisdiction by Texas fundamentally unfair,
the court held that Louisiana's statute of limitations applied to the
6
4

case.

0

The second exception to Van Dusen and Ferens builds on the
first. It explains that when venue is not proper in a forum for jurisdic-

398. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1520 (10th Cir. 1991).
399. Follette v. Clairol, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. La. 1993) (noting that Texas has a twoyear statute of limitations as opposed to Louisiana's one-year statute).
400. See id.
401. See id.
402. Id. at 843.

403. See id.
404. See id. at 846.
405. See id. at 846-47. The court explained:
The forum state may have some general interest in the defendant's affairs because it is,
to some extent, a participant in the state's economy and, possibly, the state's political
process. But this interest is so slight and so inferior to the interests of other states that it
lends little support to an argument that the exercise of general personal jurisdiction is
fair and reasonable.
Id. at 847. The court concluded that the "[pilaintiffs' interest in obtaining fair and effective relief
is served by the availability of forums in states with specific personal jurisdiction. .. ." Id.
406. See id. at 847-48.
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tional reasons, § 1406(a)," instead of § 1404(a), applies. While
§ 1406(a) allows dismissal or transfer, most courts choose to transfer
the action.0 8 Under § 1406(a) transfers, the transferee court applies
its own law because the transferor court never had personal jurisdiction to apply its law in the first place.4 A New York federal district
court explained that if venue was improper under § 1406(a) and the
suit was transferred, the transferee court's state law applies. 10 Other
courts have similarly held that, if the case is transferred under §
1404(a) or § 1406(a) to "cure a lack of personal jurisdiction," the law of
the transferee state applies.411 Despite its conceptual problems, district
courts appear to regularly transfer cases even though they lack personal jurisdiction. In McTyre v. Broward General Medical Center, the
court explained that such cases are distinguishable from Ferens because the plaintiff lacks personal jurisdiction.4 " The court concluded
that "Ferens cannot be read to allow plaintiffs to bootstrap an otherwise defeated claim by selecting the most favorable law from any of
the fifty states and [then] transfer[ing]
it to a federal court in which
13
maintained."
be
can
jurisdiction
Though effective, the first two exceptions are somewhat problematic because they allow a forum to transfer a case that it had no
business regulating in the first place. In order to overcome the problems associated with a forum's assertion of general jurisdiction, a
different exception is necessary. The third exception allows the trans407. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1994) ('The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying
venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer
such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought."). Section 1406 allows
the court the option to either dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction or transfer the case to a forum
able to assert jurisdiction.
408. See, e.g., Nation v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 121, 126 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (finding
transfer rather than dismissal "more in the 'interest of justice'"); Philip Gall & Son v. Garcia
Corp., 340 F. Supp. 1255, 1257 (E.D. Ky. 1972) (electing to transfer rather than dismiss the case
even though the court lacked jurisdiction).
409. See 15 WRIGHT ETAL, supranote 217, § 3827, at 267.
410. See Caribbean Wholesales & Serv. Corp. v. US JVC Corp., 855 F. Supp. 627, 629
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1980)); see also Geehan v.
Monahan, 382 F.2d 111, 114 (7th Cir. 1967) (explaining that a § 1404(a) transfer necessitates
application of the transferor's state law).
411. See Nelson v. International Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that
Texas did not have jurisdiction over one of the defendants; thus, the laws of California, the
transferee state, governed the case); Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 165 (3d Cir. 1980)
(holding that "where there has been an interstate transfer without personal jurisdiction, the
transferor state's choice of law does not apply to that defendant"); see also Roofing & Sheet Metal
Servs., Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982, 991-93 (11th Cir. 1982); Ellis v. Great
Southwestern Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1103-11 (5th Cir. 1981); Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 47273 (6th Cir. 1980).
412. McTyre v. Broward Gen. Med. Ctr., 749 F. Supp. 102, 108 (D.N.J. 1990).
413. Id.
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feree forum to apply its own law if a state trial court in the transferor
forum would have dismissed the cause of action under the transferor
state's forum non conveniens doctrine. This exception may be the
most powerful one. In Van Dusen, the Supreme Court explicitly
reserved the question of whether the state law of the transferor would
apply when a state court in the forum would have granted a forum
non conveniens motion under state law.414 Conferring its approval on
this exception, the Supreme Court, in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
overruled a Third Circuit interpretation of Van Dusen that required
41
no change in applicable law for forum non conveniens "transfers."
The Court went so far as to note that a plaintiffs choosing a particular
forum solely in order to take advantage of favorable law may warrant
outright dismissal."6 District courts that recognize why forum matters
have readily embraced this exception.
In CaribbeanWholesales & Services Corp. v. US JVC Corp., the
court applied this exception to a contract dispute involving a forum
selection clause.1 7 In deciding whose law to apply, the court observed
that, at first glance, Ferens appears to necessitate application of the
transferor state's law." 8 The court explained, however, that fidelity to
Erie served as the underlying principle in both Ferens and Van
4 ' It posited that the Supreme Court viewed § 1404(a) as a
Dusen.
threat to Erie because courts in the federal judiciary may transfer
cases whereas state courts can only use forum non conveniens to rid
themselves of cases in which imposing its regulatory regime would be
'° It held that, if the transfer involved no change of law, it
improper."
would result in the application of different law than if the case had
been brought in state court.4 ' The district court noted that parties in
state courts may move to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, and
414. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 640 (1964); see also Litman, supranote 146, at
594 n.165 ('The implication is that forum non conveniens dismissals normally entail a change in
applicable choice of law rules. In a transferred case in which the state court would dismiss on
forum non conveniens grounds, it therefore might be necessary to apply the law of the transferee
forum in order to preserve parallelism between the federal and state systems."). In PiperAircraft
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 247 (1981), the Court held that, in forum non conveniens
determinations, a change in the substantive law that is less favorable to the plaintiff is not given
substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry.
415. See PiperAircraft Co.,. 454 U.S. at 253.
416. See id. at 249 n.15; see also Jennings v. Boeing Co., 660 F. Supp. 796, 799 (E.D. Pa.

1987).
417. Caribbean Wholesales & Serv. Corp. v. US JVC Corp., 855 F. Supp. 627, 630-32
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). The court explained that in cases involving forum selection clauses, state courts
will routinely grant motions based on forum non conveniens. See id.
418. See id. at 630.
419. See id.
420. See id. at 631.
421. See id.
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any subsequent "transfer' (dismissal and re-filing in a more appropriate forum) would carry with it a change in applicable law."' In
order to replicate such a result in the federal judiciary and be faithful
to Erie, the district court found that "applying Van Dusen to forum
selection clause transfers would achieve precisely the opposite result:
the application of the transferor state's law rather than [the law] of
the contractually specified state. 4. 3 Such a result would produce an
opportunity for forum shopping because the applicable law would
'
depend upon whether a party filed its case in federal or state court. 2
The court observed that Van Dusen aimed to observe Erie. It
explained that by applying the transferor state's law to cases that
"state courts would have dismissed would be to apply law that state
courts would therefore not have applied. ' ' " The court reasoned that
"[t]his would violate Van Dusen's goal of ensuring that the parties
cannot 'achieve a result in federal court which could not have been
achieved in the courts of the State where the [plaintiff filed the cause
of action]."'4 21 The Court in Van Dusen explained that its holding
might not apply if the transferor forum would have simply dismissed
the cause of action on forum non conveniens grounds."7 The Court,
however, did not explicate this possible situation, even though it suggested an exception of considerable appeal." This exception is also
faithful to the principles in Erie."' It means that the applicable law
will depend not on whether the case is transferred but whether the
state court would have dismissed the case on state-based forum non
conveniens grounds.43 This creates a logistical nightmare for the
courts and is susceptible to easy manipulation since the transferee
court will have to apply the forum non conveniens rules of the transferor forum. As more states model their forum non conveniens rules
after § 1404(a) (and even develop their own uniform transfer provi-

422. See id.
423. Id.
424. See id.
425. Id.
426. Id. (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 638 (1964)). This reasoning is similar
to the reasoning behind the second exception to Van Dusen, which holds that when the
transferor court does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the transferor state's law
should not apply. See id. at 631; see also Ellis v. Great Southwestern Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1108
(5th Cir. 1981); Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs., Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, 689 F.2d 982, 992
(11th Cir. 1982).
427. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 640.
428. See id.
429. See CaribbeanWholesalers, 855 F. Supp. at 632. In fact, the exception is consistent with
Van Dusen. See id. (characterizing the exception as simply an extension of Van Dusen).
430. See id.
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sions), a § 1404(a) transfer will represent a holding by the transferor
court that the transferee's laws should apply to the action." '
The fourth exception to Van Dusen and Ferens concerns
changes in circuit interpretations of federal law. A well-established
rule holds that a transferee forum in one federal circuit need not
follow the interpretation of federal law followed in the transferor's
jurisdiction.432 The court in Center Cadillac,Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust
Co. explained that Van Dusen held only that a transferee court must
apply the substantive state law, not that it must apply the federal law
interpretation of the transferor court. 33 The court in Center Cadillac
found the principle underlying Van Dusen-fidelity to Erieinapplicable in the federal law context."
The D.C. Circuit, in In re KoreanAir Lines Disaster,upheld a
district court's application of its own law, instead of the law of the
Second Circuit, from which the case had been transferred. 5 The court
explained that applying Van Dusen to federal questions would not
produce uniformity of interpretations but would force a federal court
to apply contrary federal precedents to similar cases based on the
mere circumstance of where the plaintiff initially filed the case." Such
reasoning seems to whittle away the rule of Van Dusen.

431. See supranote 184 and accompanying text. Additionally, an understanding of forum non
conveniens becomes necessary to understand the exception to Van Dusen. See generally, e.g.,
William F. Harvey, PersonalJurisdictionand Forum Nonconveniens, 27 RES GESTAE 223 (1993)
(discussing the interplay between forum non conveniens and personal jurisdiction).
432. See Burke v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 1352, 1370 (E.D. Mich. 1993)
(explaining that federal law questions are not bound by the constraints of Van Dusen and Erie);
Wegbreit v. Marley Orchards Corp., 793 F. Supp. 965, 968-69 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (explaining the
acceptance of the rule); Bradley v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., No. 96-2569, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 30445, at *16 n.4 (4th Cir. Nov. 30, 1998) (citing authority for the federal law exception to
Ferens); Henry J. Friendly, The 'Law of the Circuit' and All That, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 406, 412
(1972) (interpreting Van Dusen as limited to state law questions); Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts
Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 692-709
(1984). But see Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that
Van Dusen applies to federal law questions); Rouchell, supranote 189, at 432-34 (collecting and
analyzing cases). Many courts, however, have criticized Berry Petroleum. See Center Cadillac,
Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 808 F. Supp. 213, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affid, 99 F.3d 401 (2d Cir.
1995) (table); Isaac v. Life Investors Ins. Co., 749 F. Supp. 855, 863 (E.D. Tenn. 1990) ("[W]hile
the law of the transferor forum on federal issues merits close consideration, it is not binding
upon the transferee forum.").
433. Center Cadillac,Inc., 808 F. Supp. at 223.
434. See id. at 224; see also In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 829 F.2d 1171, 1177 n.2 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); In re Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co. Secur. & Antitrust Litig., 543
F.2d 1058, 1065 n.19 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that Van Dusen does not apply to federal law since
federal law "is assumed to be nationally uniform, whether or not it is in fact.").
435. In re KoreanAir Lines Disaster,829 F.2d at 1175-76.
436. See id. at 1175.
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These four exceptions provide district courts with certain tools
to overcome the hurdles presented by Van Dusen and Ferens. Even
without these exceptions to Van Dusen and Ferens, § 1404(a) still
provides great protection
because forum involves much more than
43
substantive law. 1
2. Protection Without Exceptions
Some have suggested that district courts could limit Ferens to
its facts and take a case-by-case approach that achieves both fairness
and uniformity. 38 However, other avenues of protection from Ferens
are available.
First, one must remember that forum includes an entire mass
of regulatory interests. Even though § 1404(a) requires no change in
the applicable law, transfers obviously result in a change of jury pools,
judges, procedural law, etc. 39' The Court in Van Dusen acknowledged
such changes: "Of course, the transferee District Court may apply its
own rules governing the conduct and dispatch of cases in its court. We
are only concerned here with those state laws of the transferor State
which would significantly affect the outcome of the case."4 " Forum
implicates the imposition of an entire mass of regulatory influences,
only one of which is substantive law. Thus, while Van Dusen may
require the transferee forum to apply the law of the transferor forum,
it allows for the transferee forum's imposition of all its other regulatory strictures.
Second, protection is evident by looking to the reality of how
transferee courts apply the "applicable" law. The general rule from
Van Dusen and Ferens states that transferee courts apply the law of
the transferor forum, including that forum's choice of law rules.''
Courts seem to emphasize this rule when the choice of law rules of the
transferor point toward the transferee. In Bouchard v. King, the court
found that Wisconsin's choice of law rules deferred to the "interests of
a State that has a substantial concern with the litigation. 4 2 Not surprisingly, the transferee court found that the interests of its state had
a substantial concern with the litigants and that its law should

437. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
438. See Rodden, supranote 187, at 867-68.
439. See Norwood, supra note 16, at 318-19.
440. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 n.40 (1964).
441. See Sheldon v. PHH Corp., 135 F.3d 848, 852 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Ferens v. John Deere
Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990)); Bouchard v. King, 870 F. Supp. 269, 272 (D. Minn. 1994) (citing
Ferens,494 U.S. at 523, as well).
442. Bouchard,870 F. Supp. at 272.
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apply.""3 This practice illustrates that when actions are transferred to
the more appropriate forum, the transferor's choice-of-law rules
often" point towards the transferee, such that the transferee court
will ultimately apply both the substantive and procedural laws of its
sovereign.
By allowing the transferee forum to apply the transferor's
choice-of-law rules, there are inevitable opportunities for the transferee forum to ensure that its laws apply to the case. While some
state choice of law rules are mandatory, most require some weighing
of regulatory interests. " If a given case were transferred to the transferee forum for regulatory interest reasons, then it only makes sense
that the transferee forum would have no difficulty in tipping the
scales towards application of its substantive law under a regulatory
interest analysis. The caselaw provides examples of such balancing.
In Sheldon v. PHH Corp., the court determined that New York law
applied because Michigan's only connection to the cause of action was
the place of the collision.4 6 It also found that a Michigan court would
likely hold that New York's strong regulatory interests and need to
discourage forum shopping establish "rational reasons" to apply New
York substantive law.""' Recall that once a transferor court transfers a
case, it loses all control over the action."8
Van Dusen and Ferens do not conform to a regulatory understanding of § 1404(a). In fact, they ignore the importance of forum
and relegate forum to merely locational status. This Note illustrates
that forum is much more. Through the exceptions and other protections available to district courts, the rules of Van Dusen and Ferens
may be successfully diluted to ensure that a forum may apply its own
law to those actions that it has a strong interest in regulating.

443. See id.
444. This assumes, of course, that those rules provide deference to the state with the most
substantial interest in regulating the underlying dispute.
445. For example, the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws explains that when there is no
controlling state choice of law rule, courts should consider a number of relevant factors that
include regulatory interests and ease in the determination of the law to be applied. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (choice-of-law principles); id. § 145 (general
principle).
446. Sheldon v. PHH Corp., 135 F.3d 848, 855 (2d Cir. 1998).
447. See id.The court's argument is almost reminiscent of renvoi.
448. See supranotes 337-39.
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IX. CONCLUSION

This Note started with an examination of why forum matters.
It is also where this Note ends. A forum is not just a physical location.
Rather, it is the embodiment of a state's regulatory regime. Recognizing this fact requires law to protect litigants from improper assertions of jurisdiction over causes of action in which the forum has no
regulatory interest. Prior to Burnham, defendants could seek constitutional protection against fundamentally unfair assertions of general
jurisdiction. Today, common law forum non conveniens and § 1404(a)
must provide that protection. This Note illustrates how § 1404(a)
offers protection against the very real detriments of forum shopping
and improper assertions of jurisdiction.
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